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Abstract
Fire sales are among the major drivers of market instability in modern financial systems.
Due to iterated distressed selling and the associated price impact, initial shocks to some
institutions can be amplified dramatically through the network induced by portfolio over-
laps. In this paper we develop models that allow us to investigate central characteristics
that drive or hinder the propagation of distress. We investigate single systems as well as
ensembles of systems that are alike, where similarity is measured in terms of the empirical
distribution of all defining properties of a system. This asymptotic approach ensures a great
deal of robustness to statistical uncertainty and temporal fluctuations, and we give various
applications. A natural characterization of systems resilient to fire sales emerges, and we
provide explicit criteria that regulators may exploit in order to assess the stability of any
system. Moreover, we propose risk management guidelines in form of minimal capital re-
quirements, and we investigate the effect of portfolio diversification and portfolio overlap.
We test our results by Monte Carlo simulations for exemplary configurations.
1 Introduction
The inevitably complex structure of dependencies among institutions is one of the most defining
characteristics of the modern financial environment. This complexity is visible on multiple
levels, including for example the intricate distribution of corporate obligations and also the –
sometimes significant – overlap in the asset holdings of the participating institutions. While this
tremendous blend of dependencies and interactions provides the members with a great number
of opportunities, it is also the source of an enormous threat: the interlocking and pervasive
structures make the system in large parts or even as a whole fragile to possible initial local
shock events. The problem of modeling, understanding, and managing this notion of systemic
risk has been an important research topic, and it has become particularly prominent after the
strike of the global financial crisis in the years 2007/08.
One of the first papers in the context of financial mathematics to address systematically the
effect of – what they termed – cyclical dependencies among the market participants was the
seminal work by [18]. They considered the channel of default contagion, that is, the successive
propagation of balance-sheet insolvency across financial institutions, and showed, among other
results, that under mild assumptions a unique clearing vector exists that clears the obligations
of all members. From today’s viewpoint, however, it is well understood that there are various
other important channels of contagion. For instance, in his book [25] lists Asset Correlation,
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Figure 1: An illustration of a system with n = 6 financial institutions (circles) and M = 3
assets (squares). Edges represent investments of the institutions in the assets and their thickness
indicates the investment volume xmi . Furthermore, capitals ci are attached to the institutions.
Default Contagion, Liquidity Contagion and Asset Fire Sales as the four main channels of direct
and indirect default propagation.
Here we focus on the fire sales channel, which is widely accepted as one of the main drivers
of market instability, see below for many related papers. The underlying dynamics that we
consider are defined abstractly as follows. Consider a system of institutions that are invested in
certain assets, see also Figure 1, where each institution i is equipped with some initial capital
(equity) ci and holds some number x
A
i of shares of an asset A. The portfolios of the institutions
may therefore overlap, and the dependencies are quantified by the collection of the xAi ’s. Then,
as a reaction to some initial shock event, one or more of the institutions sell according to an
individual strategy a non-negligible number of shares of their assets. These sales may cause
a decline of the assets’ share prices and all investors in the sold assets incur losses in their
portfolio values. This may start another round of asset sales, possibly on an extended set of
assets, again reducing share prices and so on. By this iterative process the initial stress is
propagated through the system and can be amplified considerably. In particular, institutions
who were spared from the initial shock can get into trouble, if their portfolios overlap with those
of distressed investors.
Related Work Various approaches have been developed to model and understand the impact of
fire sales. The works [11, 31, 33] extend the classical setting from [18] for given financial networks
so that various aspects of fire sales are incorporated. [9] use a branching process approximation
to model fire sales, and they find that the system is stable when certain market parameters are
below a critical value that they specify. [26] study the benefits and disadvantages of overlapping
portfolios not only from the perspective of single institutions, but also for the market as a whole.
An important consequence of their model is that there may arise a divergence between private
and social welfare depending on the various statistical features that they consider. Alike and
related considerations are also made in [5], where a small number of assets is considered, and in
[32], where using a microfounded model it is shown that the risk of joint liquidation motivates
institutions to create heterogeneous portfolios. A related setting for reinsurance markets with
overlapping insured objects is analyzed by [28]. [14] analyze the impact of fire sales on asset
price dynamics and correlation in continuous time. In [15], extending and building upon work
of [27], they further describe the impact of the liquidation of large portfolios on the covariance
structure of asset returns and provide a quantitative explanation for spikes in volatility and
correlations observed.
Apart from the theoretical work there is a significant amount of empirical studies that
consider the effect of fire sales, develop viable models and propose measures to capture quanti-
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tatively their effects. In [23] the topology of the network of common asset holdings is analyzed
and [7] propose a network representation to quantify the interrelations induced by common asset
holdings. [12] develop a stress testing framework for fire sales and propose indices of centrality
for institutions participating in a fire sales process in [13]. There are several works that develop
exposure- and market-based measures to depict the effect of fire sales. For example, [22] use the
scalar product of two portfolios’ weights, and [29] use the so-called absorption ratio, the degree
of variation induced by the first principal components of asset returns, to measure dependence
between different sources of risk in a portfolio. Additional measures are constructed from a
statistical analysis of the equity returns of institutions, as in [1, 8, 2].
Our Results & Perspective In this paper we study various aspects of fire sales, in particular
regarding its modeling and the associated risk management.
The Deterministic Model. As already mentioned, the underlying parameters of our model
associate to each institution i a capital ci and to each pair (i, A) of an institution i and an asset
A a number xAi of shares of A that i holds. Apart from that, we equip each institution i with
an abstract strategy ρ that dictates how many of the held shares are sold in case of losses, and
we assume that there is a function h that determines the impact of the ongoing sales to the
prices of the shares. In contrast to previous works we only impose minimal assumptions at this
point: the “strategy function” ρ is right-continuous and non-decreasing – the more the price
drops the more shares are pushed off – and the “price impact function” h is continuous and
non-decreasing – the more shares are sold the more the price drops. Thus, the basic setting that
we consider is quite flexible and it enables us to model various different scenarios and strategies
for the institutions. Given all these parameters, one of our main results, given in Section 3 (in
an auxiliary model) and 4, describes the eventual loss caused by the initial stress (initial losses `i
for institution i) in the system. Let us remark that we only consider dynamics provoked by
price impact of sold shares, assuming that exogenous price changes are negligible over the short
period of time in which the fire sales take place (unlike for example as in [14]).
Let us also remark at this point that in this paper we work with the actual losses incurred
in each round of the fire sales process, which makes the model complex and its dynamics quite
involved. To the best of our knowledge and in direct comparison with previous works, this is the
first model that considers the actual losses instead of using upper bounds and approximations
that are easier to handle.
The Stochastic Model. The results described so far enable us for any given set of institutions
and assets equipped with all relevant parameters to determine for each institution the final loss
incurred by fire sales. Thus, they are readily applicable to given systems. However, we are
interested in a more fundamental question: what are the important underlying structures that
propel the process of fire sales? In other words, which system characteristics favor the emergence
of large fire sales cascades, and which ones prohibit them? Going even one step further, we
want to understand how large cascades can be prevented, for example by determining minimal
capital requirements for all institutions, so that the system as a whole is resilient to small initial
shocks.
The main contribution of this paper is a qualitative and quantitative answer to these ques-
tions, where we proceed as follows. Instead of restricting our attention only to a single system,
we consider an ensemble of systems that share common characteristics. This “structural re-
semblance” is measured in terms of the joint empirical distribution of all parameters that we
consider: the capital of each institution, the number of shares of each asset that it holds and
the initial losses that it suffers. Equivalently, it is the distribution of a vector (X, C, L), where
C is the capital, L is the initial loss, and X the vector of the number of shares (there is one
component for each asset) of an institution drawn uniformly at random among all institutions
3
in the system. The route that we take is thus to depart from any particular system and to
describe it solely by the distribution of the vector (X, C, L); hence we view any given system as
a typical realization of a random experiment where the asset holdings, the capital and the initial
loss of each institution are independent samples from (X, C, L). Similar to the deterministic
model, we describe in Section 2 for this stochastic model the final state of the system after the
fire sales cascade is completed.
This approach constitutes a (further) key difference between our work and the previous
literature on fire sales. By reducing any particular system to its bare bone characteristics, we
obtain robustness and flexibility. For example, moderate uncertainties of the precise system
configuration are absorbed. Moreover, our model is applicable to various configurations under
the premise that these are typical samples of some given distribution – this puts us in a position
to study future configurations or to develop system architectures that are resilient to fire sales.
Finally, the model can readily be calibrated based on the empirical distribution of the asset
holdings of the institutions in any given system.
The setting considered here is related to a prominent approach in a different community,
namely the study of random graphs/networks. There, sequences of networks with alike statistical
properties are studied, and the long term behavior is investigated. This approach was also used
recently to study default contagion in the financial mathematics community, see the papers [3,
16, 17]. Some of our results are similar in nature, but the process that we consider has entirely
different dynamics.
Risk Management. More than a mere description of the fire sales process, it is a central objective
to identify unstable system configurations and to devise measures to prevent disastrous fire
sales cascades. A common approach taken in the literature and in the works already cited is to
specify certain parameters, for example shock sizes and quantiles of the final damage, that are
admissible for a system to pass a stress test.
The stochastic model studied here enables us to develop an attractive supplement and
alternative to those approaches, as it puts us in the position to define in a natural and parameter-
free way a notion of resilience (stability) of a given system. More specifically, in Section 2.2 we
call a system non-resilient if an arbitrary shock (no matter how small it is) leads to a cascade
with the consequence that eventually a positive fraction of assets are sold, i.e. there exists a
positive lower bound (which is given explicitly) for the total fraction of assets sold, independent
of the size and nature of the initial shock. Note that this definition makes no sense for any given
finite system – the outcome of the process may depend on the precise specification of the ci and
xAi – but here the effect of the stochastic model is greatly beneficial: we do not consider a system
with a given number of institutions, but rather all systems where the empirical distribution of
the asset holdings, capital and initial loss is (close to) the distribution of (X, C, L). In this
setting, (non-)resilience is a property solely of (X, C, L) that may become apparent only for large
systems; however, we demonstrate in Section 5.2 that the behavior converges rather quickly and
the results are a good approximation already for systems of moderate size.
Finally, as an application we are able to derive in Section 5.1 explicit capital requirements
that ensure stability of the system, which are of fundamental interest to regulators. It turns out
that for each institution this capital buffer is solely based on its own asset holdings, thus ensuring
full transparency and fairness, which is an essential question to address when determining the
systemic riskiness of the involved institutions. We want to stress again at this point that
the particular feature of our model is that the requirements are independent of any chosen
additional parameters. As a further application, in Section 5.2 our tools allow us to quantify
the effects of portfolio diversification and similarity, thus contributing to the latest discussions
in the literature, see [5, 20, 26, 32] for example.
Outline In Section 2 we present our model of fire sales, we introduce the aforementioned notion
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of resilience and outline our main results. Section 3 deals with the analysis of an auxiliary model,
which is rather pessimistic and overestimates the losses for all institutions. The advantage of this
model is that it is much easier to study, in particular we can derive bounds for several relevant
parameters (like the total nubmer of sold assets) in terms of a solution of a fixed-point equation.
Then, in Section 4 we build the bridge between the two models, and in particular we derive
abstract and explicit criteria that guarantee resilience for the fire sales model. Section 5 deals
with applications of the developed theory and provides simulations, as outlined in the previous
paragraph. The papers closes with a conclusion that summarizes future research directions, in
particular the problem of applying our results to systems of moderate size. All proofs that are
omitted in the main part and some generalized results can be found in the Section 7.
2 Model, Resilience and Overview of the Results
In this section we define our model for fire sales, we introduce the parameters that we study
and then we outline the results that we obtain.
2.1 The Fire Sales Process
Model Parameters We consider a financial system consisting of n ∈ N institutions that can
invest in M ∈ N different (not perfectly liquid) assets or asset classes. That is, to each institution
i ∈ [n] := {1, . . . , n} we assign a number xmi ∈ R+,0 of held shares of asset m ∈ [M ] (or any other
index set of size M). See Figure 1 for an illustration. Further, we denote by ci ∈ R+ the initial
capital of institution i (for example the equity for leveraged institutions or the portfolio value
for institutions that exclusively invest in assets) and we assume that it incurs exogenous losses
`i ∈ R+,0 due to some shock event. In the case of a market crash for instance, it could be that
`i =
∑
1≤m≤M x
m
i δ
mpm, where pm denotes the initial price of one share of asset m ∈ [M ] and
δm ∈ (0, 1] is the relative price shock on the asset. Furthermore, let the empirical distribution
Fn : RM+,0 × R+,∞ × R+,0 → [0, 1] of the institutions’ parameters be denoted by
Fn(x, c, `) = n
−1 ∑
i∈[n]
1{x1i ≤ x1, . . . , xMi ≤ xM , ci ≤ c, `i ≤ `} (2.1)
and let in the following (Xn, Cn, Ln) be a random vector with distribution Fn.
Asset Sales We assume that due to the exogenous losses some of the institutions are forced
to liquidate parts of their asset holdings in order to comply with regulatory or market-imposed
constraints (e. g. leverage constraints), self-imposed risk preferences and policies to adjust the
portfolio size, or to react to investor redemption. These sales are described by a non-decreasing
function ρ : R+,0 → [0, 1] such that each institution i ∈ [n] incurring a loss of Λ sells xmi ρ(Λ/ci)
of its shares of asset m. The fraction Λ/ci describes the relative loss of institution i measured
against its initial equity. It is hence sensible to assume that
ρ(0) = 0, ρ(u) ≤ 1 and ρ(u) = ρ(1) for all u ≥ 1.
If at default of an institution the whole portfolio is to be liquidated, then ρ(1) = 1. In general,
however, the remaining assets at default may be frozen by the insolvency administrator and
only be sold to the market on a longer time scale. In this case, ρ(1) = limu→1− ρ(u) ∈ [0, 1).
Our assumptions on ρ are rather mild and allow for a flexible description of various scenarios. A
concrete and simple but useful example for a sales function is given by ρ(u) = 1{u ≥ 1}, which
describes complete liquidation of the portfolio at default (if the institution is leveraged) resp. dis-
solution. Other more involved examples, derived from various types of leverage constraints or
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considering different parameters, can be found in Section 7.3.
Some remarks are in place here. First, to simplify the exposition and the notation in the
main part we restrict our analysis to continuous ρ, and we refer to Section 7, where we provide
proofs of all our results in full generality. Second, it is possible to consider an even more general
model in which we choose different sale functions ρm for the assets m ∈ [M ]. It is then possible to
replace the scalar function ρ(u) by the diagonal matrix diag(ρ1(u), . . . , ρM (u)) in all forthcoming
considerations, so as to highlight different aspects, like liquidity constraints. Further, we may
partition the set of institutions into different types (banks, insurance companies, hedge funds,
. . . ) and choose different ρ or ρm for each type. Finally, our proofs in this article also work
for arguments (of ρ) other than Λ/ci (where Λ are the losses), but for the sake of simplicity we
stick to this particular form.
Price Impact Since the assets are not perfectly liquid (the limit order book has finite depth),
the sales of shares triggered by the exogenous shock cause prices to descent. This on the other
hand causes further losses for all the institutions invested in the assets due to mark-to-market
accounting. We model the price loss of assetm ∈ [M ] by a continuous function hm : RM+,0 → [0, 1]
that is non-decreasing in each coordinate. That is, if y = (y1, . . . , yM ) ∈ RM+,0 and nym shares
of asset m have been sold in total, then we assume that the price of m drops by hm(y).
Note the relative parametrization with the number of institutions n, where we assumed that
nym (instead of ym) shares of asset m are sold. For fixed n this is arbitrary; however, in due
course we will consider the stochastic model (see Assumption 2.1 below), and this parametriza-
tion will turn out to be rather convenient to state our results. In particular, it reflects the fact
that the market depth scales with the number of institutions involved.
Fire Sales The fire sales process that we consider combines all previous ingredients. Triggered
by some exogenous event the institutions start selling a portion of their assets and drive down
the prices. Due to mark-to-market effects, this means that institutions experience further losses
and are forced into further sales. This iterative process continues until the system stabilizes
and no further sales, losses and price changes occur. More specifically, let us denote by τ(k) =
(τ j(k))1≤j≤M the vector of cumulatively sold shares at the beginning of round k ∈ N, that is, the
number of actually sold shares in round k is τ(k+1) − τ(k) and, obviously, τ(1) = 0. Moreover,
for each bank i ∈ [n] and any round k let
• xi,k = (xji,k)1≤j≤M be the number of shares that i holds at the beginning of round k;
• `i,k be the total loss of i accumulated until the beginning of round k.
From these definitions we readily obtain that the number of shares held at the beginning of
round k
xi,1 = xi, xi,k = xi
(
1− ρ(`i,k−1/ci)
)
i ∈ [n], k ≥ 2, (2.2)
and the total number of sold shares
τ(1) = 0, τ(k) =
∑
i∈[n]
xiρ
(
`i,k−1/ci
)
, k ≥ 2. (2.3)
Moreover, from the specification of the fires sales process we obtain (see also for a justification
after the display) that
`i,k = `i + xi,kh
(
τ(k)/n
)
+
k−1∑
`=1
(xi,` − xi,`+1)h
(
τ(`)/n
)
, i ∈ [n], k ∈ N, (2.4)
as in the beginning of round k there remain xi,k shares which are affected with a price impact
of h(τ(k)/n), and in any preceding round 1 ≤ ` ≤ k−1 the number of sold shares is xi,`−xi,`+1
6
sold with a loss of h(τ(`)/n). Thus, by induction (τ(k))k∈N is non-decreasing componentwise and
bounded by
∑
i∈[n] xi. The limit
nψn := lim
k→∞
τ(k), (2.5)
that is, the vector of finally sold shares, exists. In addition to ψn we will also be interested in
the number of defaulted institution given by Dn := {i ∈ [n] : limk→∞ `i,k ≥ ci} and hence
n−1|Dn| = n−1
∑
i∈[n]
1{ lim
k→∞
`i,k ≥ ci}. (2.6)
The set Dn provides additional information about the vulnerability of the financial system and
the impact of fire sales on leveraged institutions such as banks or hedge funds. This completes
the description of the model for fire sales that we study here.
2.2 Ensembles of Systems – The Stochastic Model and Resilience
Up to now we have described the fire sales process in any specific (finite) system. Our aim
is, however, to understand qualitatively how and which characteristics of a system promote or
hinder the spread of fire sales. As portrayed in detail in the introduction, in the following we
thus consider an ensemble of systems that are similar in the sense that they all share some
(observed) statistical characteristics. This similarity is measured in terms of the most natural
parameters, namely the joint empirical distribution function (2.1) of the asset holdings, the
capital/equity, and the initial losses. In particular, we assume that we have a collection of
systems with a varying number n of institutions with the property that the sequence (Fn)n∈N
stabilizes, i.e., has a limit. Additionally, we assume convergence of the average asset holdings
to a finite value; this is a standard assumption avoiding condensation of the distribution of the
asset holdings.
Assumption 2.1. Let M ∈ N. For each n ∈ N consider a system with n institutions and M
assets specified by sequences x(n) = (xi(n))1≤i≤n of asset holdings, c(n) = (ci(n))1≤i≤n of
capitals and `(n) = (`i(n))1≤i≤n of exogenous losses. Let Fn be the empirical distribution
function of these parameters for n ∈ N (as in (2.1)) and let
(Xn, Cn, Ln) =
(
(X1n, . . . , X
M
n ), Cn, Ln)
) ∼ Fn.
Then assume the following.
(a) Convergence in distribution: There is a distribution function F such that as n→∞,
Fn(x, y, z)→ F (x, y, z) at all continuity points of F .
(b) Convergence of means: Let (X, C, L) = ((X1, . . . , XM ), C, L) ∼ F . Then as n→∞,
E[Xmn ]→ E[Xm] <∞, m ∈ [M ].
An ensemble of systems satisfying Assumption 2.1 will be called an (X, C)-system with
initial shock L in the sequel. A particular and probably the most relevant scenario is as follows.
Suppose that the distribution F is specified, for example by considering a real system. Then,
for each n ∈ N we construct a system by assigning to each institution i ∈ [n] independently
asset holdings, capital and losses sampled from F . Then, by the strong law of large numbers,
with probability 1, the sequence of systems we obtain satisfies Assumption 2.1. As in the
(deterministic) model our aim is to describe in this broader setting the final state of the system.
As institutions without any asset holdings play no role in the process and can be removed, we
shall assume that P(X1 = 0, . . . , Xm = 0) = 0.
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In order to simplify the presentation in the main part of this article we assume that the
sales function is strictly increasing around 0. It can be waived and the results in full generality
are presented the Section 7.1 and proved in 7.2.
Assumption 2.2. The sales function ρ : R+,0 → [0, 1] is continuous and strictly increasing in
a neighbourhood of 0.
(Non-)Resilience In this part of the section we approach the heart of the matter and develop
a notion of how resilient or non-resilient a given (X, C)-system is with respect to fire sales
triggered by some initial shock L. Note that all information about an initial shock comes from
the random variable L, whereas the system itself is specified by (X, C). One thing that we
can certainly then do is to consider shocks of different magnitudes on the same, crucially, a
priori unshocked system. From a regulator’s perspective, for example, a desirable property of
an (X, C)-system is the ability to absorb small local shocks L without larger parts of the system
being harmed. In our model we can even vary the statistical properties of L arbitrarily. The
following way of defining resilience thus emerges naturally: we let the shock L ‘become small’
in the sense that E[L/C]→ 0, and we call the system resilient if the asymptotic number of sold
shares ψmn (that now – explicitly – depends on L) also tends to 0.
Definition 2.3 (Resilience). An (X, C)-system is said to be resilient, if for any  > 0 there
exists δ > 0 such that for all L with E[L/C] < δ it holds lim supn→∞ ψmn ≤  for all m ∈ [M ].
Note that our definition of resilience is in terms of the final number of sold shares. There are
also other options, for example we could have based it instead on the final fraction of institutions
that defaulted, which is the ‘standard’ choice in the default contagion literature, see i.e. [16, 17].
However, we selected the final number of sold shares, as the economic cost of fire sales can be
large even when the number of defaults is rather small. In any case, all our results can easily
be adapted to a resilience condition based on the default fraction.
We now move on to define non-resilient systems. In complete analogy to the previous
considerations, we call a financial system non-resilient if the fraction of eventually sold shares
is lower bounded by some positive constant that is – crucially – independent of the shock L, as
long as this is positive. In order to ensure that the process starts at all, the shock has to affect
some banks, so we require L to be such that P(L > 0) > 0.
Definition 2.4 (Non-Resilience). A (X, C)-system is non-resilient, if there exists ∆ ∈ R+ and
an asset m ∈ [M ] such that lim infn→∞ ψmn ≥ ∆ for any initial shock L with P(L > 0) > 0.
The definition of non-resilience is rather strong, as we only require P(L > 0) > 0, and apart
from that, it is not really the complement of the notion of resilience in Definition 2.3. Rather
surprisingly, as we will show later, under Assumption 2.2 there is essentially no gap between
Definition 2.3 and Definition 2.4, that is, a system is either resilient or non-resilient. However,
when ρ is not strictly increasing, the situation may be different. This is a particularly interesting
and important setting, as it describes a situation where shock driven asset sales only occur if
some institutions have been affected to some larger extend. It thus ensures that minor losses
(e.g. resulting from mark-to-market accounting of naturally volatile assets) and major shocks
as the default of Lehman Brothers in 2008 are treated differently. As in Section 7 we treat the
important example of a sales function ρ that is not strictly increasing close to 0 we provide the
required notion of weak non-resilience here, which is the complement of Definition 2.3.
Definition 2.5 (Weak Non-Resilience). A (X, C)-system is weakly non-resilient, if it is not
resilient, i.e. there exists ∆ ∈ R+ and an asset m ∈ [M ] such that for every ε > 0 there exists
an initial shock L such that 0 < E[L/C] ≤ ε but lim infn→∞ ψmn ≥ ∆.
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Overview of the Results Having defined the notions of (non-)resilience we can give an in-
formal overview of our main findings. Given an (X, C)-system with initial shock L we first
derive explicit bounds for the final number of sold shares ψmn , m ∈ [M ] (Section 3.2), and for
the default fraction n−1|Dn| in Section 7.2. To this end, we resort to a different process, the
so-called auxiliary model described in the next section, which makes an important simplification
to the rather involved fire-sales process given by (2.2)–(2.6): instead of considering the actual
losses incurred in some round k, we overestimate them and use the simple upper bound of
xi ·h(τ(k)), where τ(k) is the vector of the total number of sold shares in the first k rounds. The
advantage is, although also challenging, that this auxiliary process can be handled analytically;
the disadvantage, however, is that it is not clear how much this simplification affects the actual
behavior. Here our contribution is to provide an explicit connection: we manage to ‘sandwich’
the fire sales process between two carefully crafted auxiliary processes, so that (non-)resilience
properties are not or minimally affected (see Section 4.1).
With this coupling at hand we manage to derive explicit (non-)resilience criteria for (X, C)-
systems. As it turns out (see Section 4.1 and 4.2), the behavior of such a system can be captured
by a collection of functions (fm)m∈[M ], which essentially describe the evolution of the price of
the corresponding asset during the execution of the (auxiliary) process. The joint zero of these
functions coincides with the final number of sold shares and thus allows us to study resilient
and non-resilient cases. With these tools at hand, we are able to derive qualitative criteria
that depend on the parameters of system – X,C – and of the process – the sales function
ρ and the price impact h – only and characterize resilience. For example, we show that if
E[X2/C]ρ′(0) > 1, then the system is non-resilient: the first factor says informally that the
capital is too small in direct comparison to the asset holdings, and the second that selling
begins immediately as a response to a price drop. On the other hand, if E[X2/C]ρ′(0) < 1 and
ρ′(0) > 0, then the system is resilient. We also consider cases in which ρ′(0) = 0; there we show
that the actual interplay between ρ and h (price drop) determines if the system is resilient or
not. Several results of this kind are presented in Section 4.2.
3 The Auxiliary Model
3.1 The Auxiliary Process
As already described previously, the aim of this section is to formulate an alternative to the fire
sales process defined by (2.2)–(2.6), which is more amenable to an analytic treatment. Note
that the essence of the fire sales process lies in Equation (2.4): the behavior is rather complex,
as we need to keep track of the asset sales in all rounds. In order to make the analysis tractable,
we will substitute (2.4) with a conservative assumption that overestimates the loss as follows:
we will forget the actual prices at which assets were sold in previous rounds, and we will bound
them from below by using the price impact in the current round – which is of course at least as
large as the impact in previous rounds. More specifically, note that
`i,k ≤ `i + xih(τ(k)/n), i ∈ [n], k ∈ N. (3.1)
In the following we describe an auxiliary fire sales process, in which we replace the actual loss
`i,k by the simple upper bound. (As we already said, this process will serve as a tool to gain
understanding of the real process.) We now provide a description of the final state of the system
after this auxiliary fire sales process is completed; in particular, we are interested in the vector
χn of the number of finally sold shares divided by n and the final price impact h
m(χn) on any
asset m ∈ [M ]. Since we will be using it throughout the rest of the paper, Table 2 contrasts
our notation for the fire sales process and the auxiliary process defined in the current section.
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Fire Sales Process Auxiliary Process
vector of finally sold shares (divided by n) ψn = (ψ
1
n, . . . , ψ
m
n ) χn = (χ
1
n, . . . , χ
m
n )
vector of sold shares in rounds 1, . . . , k τ(k) = (τ
1
(k), . . . , τ
M
(k)) σ(k) = (σ
1
(k), . . . , σ
M
(k))
Figure 2: Notation for the fire sales and the auxiliary process.
In order to describe χn we again consider the process in rounds, where in each round
institutions react to the price changes from the previous round. Denote by σ(k) = (σ
1
(k), . . . , σ
M
(k))
the vector of cumulatively sold shares in round k. We readily obtain
σ(1) =
∑
i∈[n]
xiρ
(
`i
ci
)
= nE
[
Xnρ
(
Ln
Cn
)]
.
Similarly, in round k ≥ 2
σ(k) =
∑
i∈[n]
xiρ
(
`i + xi · h(n−1σ(k−1))
ci
)
= nE
[
Xnρ
(
Ln +Xn · h(n−1σ(k−1))
Cn
)]
. (3.2)
Thus, by induction (σ(k))k∈N is non-decreasing componentwise and bounded by nE[Xn]. The
limit nχn := limk→∞ σ(k) – the vector of finally sold shares in the auxiliary process – exists.
In contrast to the fire sales process, it turns out that for the auxiliary process, the number
of sold shares χn can be derived by solving a rather simple equation.
Proposition 3.1. Consider the auxiliary fire sales process as described above. Then χn =
n−1 limk→∞ σ(k), the number of sold shares divided by n at the end of the auxiliary process, is
the smallest (componentwise) solution of
E
[
Xnρ
(
Ln +Xn · h(χ)
Cn
)]
− χ = 0. (3.3)
Proof. Proof. By continuity of ρ and the dominated convergence theorem
χn = n
−1 lim
k→∞
σ(k) = lim
k→∞
E
[
Xnρ
(
Ln +Xn · h(n−1σ(k−1))
Cn
)]
= E
[
Xnρ
(
Ln +Xn · h(n−1 limk→∞ σ(k−1))
Cn
)]
= E
[
Xnρ
(
Ln +Xn · h(n−1χn)
Cn
)]
and χn is thus a solution of (3.3).
By the Knaster-Tarski theorem there must exist a least fixed point χˆn. Clearly, σ(0) := 0 ≤
nχˆn. Hence assume inductively that σ(k) ≤ nχˆn for k ≥ 1. Then
σ(k+1) =
∑
i∈[n]
xiρ
(
`i + xi · h(n−1σ(k))
ci
)
≤
∑
i∈[n]
xiρ
(
`i + xi · h(χˆn)
ci
)
= nχˆn (3.4)
by monotonicity of ρ, and hence χn = n
−1 limk→∞ σ(k) ≤ χˆn. By definition of χˆn it thus holds
that χn = χˆn.
Further, given χn, we readily obtain that under the auxiliary process the set of finally
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defaulted institutions Dn := {i ∈ [n] : `i + xi · h(χn) ≥ ci} and hence
n−1|Dn| = n−1
∑
i∈[n]
1{`i + xi · h(χn) ≥ ci} = P (Ln +Xn · h(χn) ≥ Cn) . (3.5)
Note that we slightly ‘overload’ the notation, as we use Dn for both the fires sales and the
auxiliary process. Since it will be always clear from the context which processes is studied, this
should cause no confusion.
Let us close this section with a remark about the case of non-continuous sales function ρ.
The following example shows that also in this case it may be possible to determine the final
state of the system by the smallest solution of (3.3). Consider ρ(u) = 1{u ≥ 1}, that is,
institutions sell their portfolio as they go bankrupt. Then σ(k) 6= σ(k−1) only if in round k at
least one institution defaults that was solvent in round k−1. Since there are only n institutions,
the fire sales process stops after at most n − 1 rounds and the vector χn of finally sold shares
divided by n solves (3.3). Again by (3.4) we then obtain χn = χˆn is the smallest solution of
(3.3). By a similar reasoning we derive more generally for any sale function ρ with finitely many
discontinuities that χn = χˆn.
3.2 The Auxiliary Process in the Stochastic Model
Proposition 3.1 describes the final state of any (finite) system when we consider the auxiliary
process. Here we extend our considerations to stochastic systems, as we did in the case of the
fire sales process. We are given an (X, C)-system with initial shock L, that is, an ensemble
of systems, where for each n ∈ N a system with n institutions and M assets is specified by
sequences of asset holdings, capitals and exogenous losses with joint distribution (Xn, Cn, Ln).
We also assume that the system satisfies Assumption 2.1, that is, the distribution of (Xn, Cn, Ln)
converges to that of (X, C, L) and the asset holdings are in L1.
Applying Proposition 3.1 to each one of the systems in the ensemble, we obtain that for
each n ∈ N, the number of sold shares divided by n at the end of the auxiliary process is the
smallest solution of (3.3). Since (Xn, Cn, Ln)→ (X, C, L) it is thus natural to believe that for
large n, the number of finally sold shares χn is close to the smallest (componentwise) solution
of the ‘limiting equation’
E
[
Xρ
(
L+X · h(χ)
C
)]
− χ = 0. (3.6)
As it will turn out, except for few pathological situations, this intuition is indeed correct and
motivates the following definitions. Let
fm(χ) := E
[
Xmρ
(
L+X · h(χ)
C
)]
− χm, m ∈ [M ]. (3.7)
Further, let
S :=
⋂
m∈[M ]
{
χ ∈ RM+,0 : fm(χ) ≥ 0
}
(3.8)
the subset where all of the functions fm, m ∈ [M ], are non-negative. Let χˆ be the smallest
joint root (which always exists by the Knaster-Tarski theorem) of the functions fm,m ∈ [M ].
While the necessity of Assumption 2.1 is obvious it is surprising that in most cases it is actually
also sufficient to ensure that
χˆ = lim
n→∞χn. (3.9)
Finally, in analogy to (3.5) we can therefore expect for the stochastic model that the final
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Figure 3: Figure corresponding to Example 3.2. Plot of function f(χ) (blue) for three different
example systems. The set S is depicted in orange.
fraction of defaulted institutions in the auxiliary model is given by
lim
n→∞n
−1|Dn| = g(χˆ), where g(χ) := P(L+X · h(χ) ≥ C). (3.10)
To illustrate under which conditions the previous statements are true and the intuition is right,
let us look at an instructive example with one asset only (M = 1). This is a carefully crafted ‘toy
example’ that is unlikely to model a real system, but it will reveal the important characteristics
that determine the underlying behavior.
Example 3.2. Consider a system defined by
h(χ) = χ, ρ(y) = 1{y ≥ 1}, X ∼ Exp(1), C ≡ c, P(L = c) = 0.15 and P(L = 0) = 0.85,
where L is independent of X and c = 0.75. See Figure 3(a) for an illustration of f , S and
χˆ. There χˆ is the only root of f and the set S is the interval [0, χˆ]. The situation changes,
however, as we vary the capital. See Figure 3(c) for the case of c = 0.95. Then S consists of
two disjoint intervals and f has three roots. In fact, one can observe the splitting of S and thus
a discontinuity of χˆ at c ≈ 0.91, see Figure 3(b). The situation in Figure 3(b) presents a rather
special and pathological case. In fact, only in this very special case above heuristics fail and the
situation becomes more complex than suggested in (3.9) and (3.10).
In order to formalize the special situation encountered in the previous example, let us denote
by S0 the largest connected subset of S containing 0 (clearly 0 ∈ S). Further, let
χ∗ ∈ RM+,0 with (χ∗)m := sup
χ∈S0
χm. (3.11)
Lemma 3.3. There exists a smallest joint root χˆ of all functions fm(χ), m ∈ [M ], with χˆ ∈ S0.
Further, χ∗ as defined above is a joint root of the functions fm, m ∈ [M ], and χ∗ ∈ S0.
The special case from Figure 3(b) is then described by χˆ 6= χ∗, and in all other cases χˆ = χ∗.
We shall henceforth term the former case as ‘pathological’, since we can only obtain it if we
maliciously fine-tune the parameters of the system to provoke such a behavior. We do not
expect such situations to occur or to be relevant, and in any case, in all settings that we study
here they don’t.
Our first result provides in non-pathological cases (that is, when χˆ = χ∗) the asymptotic
number of finally sold shares for the auxiliary process and in all other cases upper and lower
bounds.
Theorem 3.4. Consider a (X, C)-system with initial shock L satisfying Assumptions 2.1, 2.2.
Then the number χmn of finally sold shares of asset m ∈ [M ] divided by n in the auxiliary process
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satisfies
χˆm + o(1) ≤ χmn ≤ (χ∗)m + o(1).
In particular, for the final price impact hm(χn) on asset m ∈ [M ]
hm(χˆ) + o(1) ≤ hm(χn) ≤ hm(χ∗) + o(1).
3.3 Resilience Criteria for the Auxiliary Process
In the previous section we derived results that allow us to determine the final default fraction in
(X, C)-systems caused by the auxiliary process and sparked by some exogenous shock L. In this
section we go one step further and investigate whether a given system in an initially unshocked
state is likely to be resilient to small shocks or susceptible to fire sales.
Note that all information about an initial shock comes from the random variable L, whereas
the system itself is specified by (X, C). So we can easily consider shocks of different magnitude L
on the same a priori unshocked system. In the following, whenever we use the notation g, fm and
χ∗, we always mean the quantities (3.7)-(3.10) from the previous section for the (X, C)-system
with initial shock L ≡ 0. We shall first provide resilience criteria for the auxiliary system.
Theorem 3.5. For each  > 0 there exists δ > 0 such that for all L with E[L/C] < δ the
number nχmn,L of finally sold shares of each asset m ∈ [M ] for the auxiliary process satisfy
lim sup
n→∞
χmn,L ≤ (χ∗)m + , m ∈ [M ].
We immediately obtain the following handy resilience criterion.
Corollary 3.6 (Resilience Criterion). If χ∗ = 0, then the (X, C)-system is resilient under the
auxiliary process.
Note that g(0) = 0 and hence there are only few defaults if the system is resilient (i.e. χ∗ = 0,
S0 = {0}). It is possible, however, that g(χ∗) = 0 while χ∗ 6= 0 in which case a shock triggers
a large fraction of asset sales but only very few defaults.
We now turn to non-resilience criteria and study the case χ∗ > 0. Since ρ(0) = 0 and L ≡ 0,
we obtain that fm(0) = 0,m ∈ [M ], that is, χˆ = 0 and thus Theorem 3.4 does not give any
useful lower bound for the number of sold shares. However, if we consider a positive shock L on
the system, then 0 is not anymore a joint root of the functions (3.7), and Theorem 3.4 guarantees
that χmn ≥ ∆m − o(1) as n → ∞, where ∆ is the smallest such joint root. In particular, if we
neglect pathological situations as described in Section 3.2, then ∆ should be (close to) χ∗; as
the next result shows, this is for example the case when there is no joint root of the (fm)m∈[M ]
between 0 and χ∗.
Theorem 3.7. Consider a (X, C)-system such that χ∗ > 0 and such that every z ∈ RM \{0,χ∗}
with 0 ≤ z ≤ χ∗ (coordinate-wise) is not a joint root of the functions (fm)m∈[M ]. Then the
system is non-resilient under the auxiliary process, in particular
χmn,L ≥ (χ∗)m − o(1), m ∈ [M ],
where nχmn,L is the number of finally sold shares of asset m.
As already remarked previously, we do not expect that situations other than the ones covered
by the previous result will ever be relevant. In any case, the conclusion of non-resilience is for
example also true if we request that there are only finitely many roots, or that the roots are
bounded away from 0, an observation we shall regularly use in proofs. Constructing such highly
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Figure 4: Figure corresponding to Example 3.8. Plot of the zero lines for f1 (blue) and f2
(yellow) of the unshocked system (solid) and the shocked system (dashed). Left (a) depicts a
resilient system and right (b) a non-resilient system.
artificial examples, where the infimum of the set of roots is 0, would require an enormous
fine-tuning of the system parameters (and enough malicious energy).
Let us finally remark here that Theorem 3.7 is not true without the assumption that ρ is
strictly increasing. This becomes clear by looking at the particular example ρ(u) = 1{u ≥ 1} of
sales at default. Asset sales will only happen if some banks default initially, that is, P(L > C) >
0; a shock which is such that P(L > C) = 0 can not trigger any sales. In Theorem 7.5 we show,
however, that for χ∗ > 0 the system is always weakly non-resilient. This completes our analysis
of (non-)resilience properties under the auxiliary process. We close the section with an (again
artificial) example demonstrating the qualitative difference between resilient and non-resilient
systems.
Example 3.8. Let f(x) = 1.5x−5/21[x ≥ 1] and let X be a random variable with density f .
Consider a system with two assets (M = 2) defined by
h(χ) = χ, ρ(u) = min{1, u2}, X1 = X2 = X, C = 10Xγ
Moreover, we consider a shock L independent of X with P(L = C) = 0.03. See Figure 4(a)
for an illustration of f1, f2 when γ = 0.6 and 4(b) for the case γ = 0.4. The solid yellow and
blue lines mark the zero sets of the functions f1 and f2 for the unshocked system. For γ = 0.6
(a) the system is resilient (χ∗ = 0, S0 = {0}) as the solid lines cross in 0, for γ = 0.4 (b)
the system is non-resilient and S0 is the area bounded by the solid lines, which cross first in
χ∗ 6= 0. The dashed lines are the zero lines for the functions for the shocked system and the
coordinates of their intersection mark the number of sold shares. The smaller the shock, the
closer the dashed lines of the shocked system will approach the lines of the unshocked system.
While in the resilient case (a) this pushes their intersection towards 0 and only few shares are
sold, in the non-resilient system, as the shock gets smaller, the intersection of the dashed lines
are approaching χ∗ 6= 0 and thus lower bounded, no matter how small the shock is.
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4 The Fire Sales Process
4.1 Bounding the Fire Sales Process with the Auxiliary Process
In this section we establish an explicit connection between the fire sales process (2.2)–(2.6) and
the auxiliary process described and studied in the previous section. In particular, we will use
the final number of sold assets χn = n
−1 limk→∞ σ(k) in a specific auxiliary processes to bound
the asset sales ψn = n
−1 limk→∞ τ(k) in the real process.
Let us start with a simple observation. For a given finite financial system (Xn, Cn) with
shock Ln and specified functions ρ and h, it easily follows from (2.4) and (3.1) that the auxiliary
process leads to more asset sales, to a higher price impact and as a result also to more defaults.
Thus, the auxiliary process always serves as an upper bound for the fire sales process (regarding
the actual asset sales and also the final default fraction). This is summarized in the following
theorem. In the rest of this section we (silently) consider a (X, C)-system with initial shock L
that satifies Assumptions 2.1 and 2.2.
Theorem 4.1. Let ψmn be the number of finally sold shares of asset m ∈ [M ] divided by n in
the fire sales process. Let χ∗ be as in (3.11). Then
lim sup
n→∞
ψmn ≤ (χ∗)m.
Proof. Proof According to our assumptions, the functions ρ : R+,0 → [0, 1] and hm : RM+,0 →
[0, 1] are non-decreasing and τ(1) = σ(1) = 0. From (2.4) and (3.1) we obtain that
`i,k = `i + xi,kh(τ(k)/n) +
k−1∑
`=1
(xi,` − xi,`+1)h(τ(`)/n) ≤ `i + xih(τ(k)/n)
it follows that ρ(`i,k) ≤ ρ(`i+xih(τ(k)/n)) and as a result τ(k) ≤ σ(k). Thusψn = limk→∞ τ(k)n−1 ≤
limk→∞ σ(k)n−1 = χn. By Theorem 3.4, we know that for the auxiliary process, lim supn→∞ χmn ≤
(χ∗)m and thus it follows that lim supn→∞ ψmn ≤ (χ∗)m.
More surprisingly, as we shall see below, we can adapt carefully the parameters of the given
system so as to also obtain lower bounds from the auxiliary process. The central idea is to
define the auxiliary process on another system having smaller initial asset holdings and a sales
function that is dominated point-wise by the original one. More specifically, let us fix ε > 0.
Define δε := ρ
−1(ε), where ρ−1 denotes the generalized inverse of ρ. In addition to ρ, define the
sales function ρε : R+,0 → [0, 1] by
ρε(u) = ρ(u)1{u ≤ δε}+ ε1{δε < u}.
Further, we consider a system that is derived from the (X, C)-system with initial shock L but
with asset holdings (1− ε)X instead. In analogy to (3.7) we consider for this system
fmε (χ) := E
[
(1− ε)Xmρε
(
L+ (1− ε)X · h(χ)
C
)]
− χm, m ∈ [M ]. (4.1)
Further, also in analogy to (3.8), let
Sε :=
⋂
m∈[M ]
{
χ ∈ RM+,0 : fmε (χ) ≥ 0
}
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and let Sε,0 be the largest connected subset of Sε containing 0 and further, let χˆε ∈ Sε,0 the
smallest joint root of the functions fmε ,m ∈ [M ]. We obtain the following crucial lower bound:
Theorem 4.2. Let ψmn be the number of finally sold shares of asset m ∈ [M ] divided by n in
the fire sales process. For every ε > 0
lim inf
n→∞ ψ
m
n ≥ χˆmε .
Proof. Proof For every n ∈ N we consider a system (Xn, Cn, Ln) satisfying Assumptions 1 and
2. Then it is immediate that the sequence ((1− ε)Xn, Cn, Ln)n∈N satisfies Assumption 2.1 with
limiting distribution ((1− ε)X, C, L). We now fix n ∈ N. As usual, let τ(k) be the total number
of assets sold in round k in (Xn, Cn, Ln) with sales function ρ under the fire sales process.
Further, let σ(k) be the total number of assets sold in round k in ((1− ε)Xn, Cn, Ln) with sales
function ρε in the auxiliary process. We shall show that σ(k) ≤ τ(k), which implies that χn =
limk→∞ σ(k)n−1 ≤ limk→∞ τ(k)n−1 = ψn and since by Theorem 3.4, lim infn→∞ χn ≥ χˆmε , the
claim follows. In order to show that σ(k) ≤ τ(k) we use induction. By definition σ(1) = τ(1) = 0.
So, lets assume that σ(1) ≤ τ(1), . . . ,σ(k) ≤ τ(k). We determine the number of assets bank i sells
in round k. First consider the case that `i,k/ci ≤ δ, that is, the loss of bank i at the beginning
of round k is bounded by δ and thus the fraction of shares sold so far is less than ε. As a result
xi,k ≥ (1− ε)xi and thus
xi(1− ε)ρε
(
`i + (1− ε)xi · h(σ(k)n−1)
ci
)
≤ xiρ
(
`i + (1− ε)xi · h(σ(k)n−1)
ci
)
(4.2)
≤ xiρ
(
`i + xi,k · h(σ(k)n−1)
ci
)
≤ xiρ
(
`i + xi,k · h(τ(k)n−1)
ci
)
≤ xiρ
(
`i,k
ci
)
. (4.3)
If, on the contrary, `i,k/ci > δ, then
xi(1− ε)ρε
(
`i + (1− ε)xi · h(σ(k)n−1)
ci
)
≤ xi(1− ε)ε ≤ xiρ
(
`i,k
ci
)
and again bank i has sold more shares in step k of the fire sales process in (Xn, Cn, Ln) with
sales function ρ than in the auxiliary process in ((1− ε)Xn, Cn, Ln) with sales function ρε. We
infer
σ(k+1) =
∑
i∈[n]
xi(1− ε)ρε
(
`i + (1− ε)xi · h(σ(k)n−1)
ci
)
≤
∑
i∈[n]
xiρ
(
`i,k
ci
)
= τ(k+1)
and the induction step is completed.
4.2 (Non-)Resilience Criteria for the Fire Sales Process
As considered before for the auxiliary process, we now investigate resilience properties of the
fire sales process. We denote by χ∗,ε the smallest joint root of the functions fmε ,m ∈ [M ] as
defined in Section 4.1 with L = 0. Due to the conservative character of the auxiliary process,
it is immediate that resilience of the auxiliary process for system (X, C) implies resilience of
the fire sales process for the system. Contrary, non-resilience under the fire sales process of in
(X, C) implies non-resilience also under the auxiliary process for (X, C).
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Corollary 4.3. If χ∗ = 0, then the (X, C)-system is resilient under the fire sales process. If
there exists ε > 0 such that χ∗,ε > 0 and such that every z ∈ RM \ {0,χ∗,ε} with 0 ≤ z ≤ χ∗,ε
(coordinate-wise) is not a joint root of the functions (fmε )m∈[M ], then the (X, C)-system is
non-resilient under the fire sales process.
Proof. Proof The first claim about resilience is a straightforward consequence of Theorem 4.1.
For the second part note that if there exist ε > 0 such that χ∗,ε > 0 > 0, then the system
((1 − ε)X, C) with sales function ρε is non-resilient for the auxiliary process by Theorem 3.7
(and its extension in 7.1.3) and for every shock L, the number of sold assets over n, χn it
holds that lim infn→∞χmn ≥ χ∗,ε > 0. By Theorem 4.2 it follows that under the real process
in the system (X, C) with sales function ρ the number nψmn of assets m ∈ [M ] sold fulfills
lim infn→∞ ψmn ≥ (χ∗,ε)m > 0 for every shock L, which implies non-resilience.
We will now present several more explicit (non-)resilience criteria for the fire sales process;
in particular, we will show that in many natural situations the fire sales and the auxiliary
processes behave the same with respect to their resilience properties. A starting point is the
following observation, which states that in many cases an analysis of the derivatives at 0 of the
functionals fm,m ∈ [M ] describing the auxiliary system can be used to study (non-)resilience.
Theorem 4.4. Assume that ρ is differentiable in 0, and that there exists m ∈ [M ] such that
all partial right-derivatives ∂∂χmh
`(0), ` ∈ [M ] exist (possibly with value ∞) and
E
Xmρ′(0)
∑
`∈[M ]
X`
∂
∂χm
h`(0)
 /C
 > 1. (4.4)
Then the (X, C)-system with sales function ρ is non-resilient under the fire sales process.
Proof. Proof Let χm0 be the M dimensional vector which has value χ in the m-th entry
and zero in all other entries. It is sufficient to show that there exists ε > 0 such that
lim infχ→0 fmε (χm0 )/χ > 0 since fmε is monotone increasing in the arguments [M ] \ {m}. Using
the lemma of Fatou and that ρ(u) = ρε(u) for small u, we obtain
lim inf
χ→0
fmε (χ
m
0 )/χ = lim inf
χ→0
E
[
(1− ε)Xmρε
(
(1− ε)X · h(χm0 )
C
)
/χ
]
− 1
≥ E
[
lim inf
χ→0
(1− ε)Xmρε
(
(1− ε)X · h(χm0 )
C
)
/χ
]
− 1
= E
[
(1− ε)Xm lim inf
χ→0
ρ
(
(1− ε)X · h(χm0 )
C
)
/χ
]
− 1
= (1− ε)2E
Xmρ′(0)
∑
`∈[M ]
X`
∂
∂χm
h`(0)
 /C
− 1,
and by (4.4) this expression is larger than zero for small ε > 0. Thus non-resilience follows for
the fire sales process.
The previous theorem allows us to show that in many relevant situations actually the auxil-
iary and the real process are equivalent in terms of resilience. Let us consider the one dimensional
system (i.e., m = 1) in the important case of linear price impact (i.e., h(χ) = χ). The following
corollary shows that in most cases the resilience properties of the processes coincide.
Corollary 4.5. Let h(χ) = χ and let ρ be differentiable in 0. Then the following holds.
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1. E[X2/C] = ∞ and ρ′(0) > 0: the system is non-resilient under both (fire sales and
auxiliary) process.
2. E[X2/C] <∞ and ρ′(0) > 0: the systems are resilient under both processes if E[(X2/C)ρ′(0)] <
1 and non-resilient if E[(X2/C)ρ′(0)] > 1.
3. E[X2/C] <∞ and ρ′(0) = 0: the systems are resilient under both processes.
Proof. Proof For 1. non-resilience follows from Theorem 4.4 as the expectation in (4.4) is
infinite. For 2., if E[(X2/C)ρ′(0)] > 1 non-resilience follows again directly from Theorem 4.4.
Let f = f1. To show resilience for E[(X2/C)ρ′(0)] < 1, note that by the Dominated Convergence
Theorem
f ′(0) = E
[
Xρ′(0)
(
X
∂
∂χ
h(0)
)
/C
]
− 1 = E[X2ρ′(0)/C]− 1 < 0
and thus S0 = {0} and χ∗ = 0, which implies with Corollary 3.6 that the system is resilient
under the auxiliary process, and so also under the fire sales process. Case 3. follows similarly.
Corollary 4.5 misses the case E[X2/C] = ∞ und ρ′(0) = 0. This case represents a scenario
of a heterogeneous system with a rather low market reaction to stress, and is thus of particular
interest. Note that in this case the expectation in (4.4) equals 0 and based on Theorem 4.4 we
cannot prove non-resilience of the real system. Moreover, we cannot use dominated convergence
to derive the derivative of f = f1 and to conclude (non-)resilience.
In order to address this case we make more refined assumptions. In particular, we assume
that h(χ) = χν for some ν and ρ(u) = uq ∧ 1 for q ∈ (0,∞). In addition we allow for q = ∞
which describes sales at default (i.e. ρ(u) = 1{u≥1}.) The next result, whose proof is presented
in Section 7.2.2, shows that (non-)resilience is a property that depends on the interplay of ρ
and h.
Theorem 4.6. Let m = 1 and P(X,C > 0) = 1. Then the following holds.
1. 1− νq > 0: the system is non-resilient.
2. 1−νq = 0: the system is resilient if E[X(X/C)1/ν ] < 1 and non-resilient if E[X(X/C)1/ν ] >
1.
3. 1 − νq < 0 or q = ∞: Let α∗ = sup{α ∈ R : E[X1+α/Cα] < ∞}. If α∗ > 1/ν, then the
system is resilient. If α∗ < 1/ν and f ′(0) exists, then the system is non-resilient.
The previous results are restricted to systems with one asset only. They can be generalized
to systems with multiple assets in various forms. For example, we can assume that for each
asset m ∈ [M ] with M ≥ 2 we have a specific price impact function hm(χ) = (χm)νm . Then
an argument as before shows that if 1 − qminm∈[M ] νm > 0, then the system is non-resilient.
Moreover, if
1− q min
m∈[M ]
νm = 0 and max
m∈[M ]
E
Xm( ∑
`∈[M ]
X`/C
)1/ν > 1,
then the system is non-resilient (corresponding to a generalization of 2. in Theorem 4.6). Re-
silience is more difficult to characterize, as it may depend on the interplay among different
assets. In these cases, Theorem 4.4 and Corollary 4.3 may be used to study resilience properties
for the system at hand. We leave it as a research problem to extract further and more explicit
(non-)resilience conditions from our main results.
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5 Applications: Minimal Capital Requirements & The Effect of
the Portofolio Structure
In this section we apply the theory developed in previous sections to investigate which structures
or properties of systems hinder or promote the emergence and spread of fire sales. In the next
subsection we address the important question of formulating adequate capital requirements: how
much capital is necessary and sufficient for each bank, so that the system at hand is resilient?
We give an answer to this question in the specific setting where the asset holdings follow a power-
law distribution, which is the most typical case to consider. Then, in Section 5.2 we consider
systems parametrized by two orthogonal characteristic quantities: portfolio diversification and
portfolio similarity. We first study their effect analytically based on our previous results, and
we also verify our findings with simulations for finite systems of reasonable size. Our examples
demonstrate the effects of portfolio diversification and similarity on resilience in various sensible
settings.
5.1 Minimal Capital Requirements
While the results in the previous section allow regulators to test the resilience of financial systems
with respect to fire sales, a natural question from a regulatory perspective is to determine capital
requirements that actually ensure resilience.
Historically, the first approach to systemic risk was to apply a monetary risk measure to
some aggregated, system-wide risk factor, see [10, 30, 24] for an axiomatic characterization of
this family of risk measures. Another approach is to determine the total risk by specifying
capital requirements on an institutional level before aggregating to a system-wide risk factor,
see [4, 6, 19]. An important question is then whether from an institutional viewpoint the
requirements correspond to fair shares of the systemic risk, see e.g. [6]. In particular, a major
problem in the implementation of the methodologies proposed in the aforementioned papers is
that a given individual capital requirement in general depends on the configuration of the whole
system. As a consequence, one institution’s capital requirement may be manipulated by other
institutions’ behaviour, or the entrance of a new institution into the system would potentially
alter the capital requirements of all other institutions, for example. An important contribution
of the methodology proposed here is that, besides certain global parameters that need to be
determined by a regulating institution, the implied requirement for a given institution i ∈ [n]
depend on its local parameters, i.e., its capital and asset holdings, only.
Abstractly, a capital requirement is a function b : Rm+ → R+ that assigns to any bank
i ∈ [n] with asset holdings x1i , . . . , xni a (minimal) required capital ci = b(x1, . . . , xn). In our
stochastic setting this implies that C = b(X1, . . . , Xm) is a random variable and we would like
to give conditions on b that ensure resilience. We provide here only stylized examples for which
analytic derivations are possible to illustrate the power of the stochastic model. For general
system configurations one can always resort to numerical calculations.
Let us now assume that the distribution FX of asset holdings has power law tail in the sense
that there exist constants B1, B2 ∈ (0,∞) such that for x large enough
B1x
1−β ≤ 1− FX(x) ≤ B2x1−β, (5.1)
for some β > 2. There is empirical evidence for power laws in investment volumes, see e.g. [21].
Moreover, we assume the setting of Section 4.2, that is, we assume that h(χ) = χν for some ν
and ρ(u) = uq ∧ 1 for q ∈ (0,∞].
One natural choice for the capitals ci as a function of the asset holdings is of power form.
We immediately get the following corollary, whose proof is a direct consequence of Theorem 4.6,
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that determines sharply the magnitude of the minimal capital requirements to ensure resilience.
Corollary 5.1. Let 1− νq < 0 or q =∞ and ci = αxγi for α ∈ R+ and γ ∈ R+,0. Then,
1. if γ > 1− ν(β − 2), then the system is resilient.
2. if γ < 1− ν(β − 2), then the system is non-resilient.
Proof. Proof We verify the conditions of Theorem 4.6, i.e., we show that α∗ > 1/ν (resp. < 1/ν)
where α∗ = sup{α ∈ R : E[X1+α/Cα] < ∞}. By the choice of capital C = Xγ we get that
E[X1+α/Cα] = E[X1+α(1−γ)] which is < ∞ (resp. ∞) for α < (β − 2)/(1 − γ) (resp. α >
(β − 2)/(1 − γ)). Under Assumption 1. then α∗ > 1/ν while under Assumption 2. α∗ < 1/ν.
Additionally we can derive sufficient capital requirement in the multidimensional case. In
this setting we assume there exist constants B1,m, B2,m ∈ (0,∞) and βm for m ∈ [M ] such that
for x large enough
B1,mx
1−βm ≤ 1− FXm(x) ≤ B2,mx1−βm . (5.2)
Corollary 5.2. Let 1 − νq < 0 or q = ∞ and ci = (
∑
m∈[M ] αx
m
i )
γ for some α ∈ R+ and
γ ∈ R+,0. Let βmin := min{β1, . . . , βm}. Then,
1. if γ > 1− ν(βmin − 2), then the system is resilient.
2. if γ < 1− ν(βmin − 2), then the system is non-resilient.
Proof. Proof The proof is immediate from Lemma 5.3 below, which allows to reduce to the one
dimensional situation.
The following result might be known, but we did not find reference to it in the literature.
We provide a proof for completeness.
Lemma 5.3. Let Xm,m ∈ [M ] be random variables with power law tails as above and let
βmin := min{β1, . . . , βm}. Then there exists B1, B2 > 0 such that
B1x
1−βmin ≤ 1− FX1+...XM (x) ≤ B2x1−βmin . (5.3)
Proof. Proof We assume that M = 2; the result for general M follows by induction. Let us
further assume without loss of generality that FX1(x) = FX2(x) = 0 for x < 1 and βmin = β1 ≤
β2. Clearly,
1− FX1+X2(x) = P(X1 +X2 > x) ≥ P(X1 > x) = 1− FX1(x) ≥ B1,1x1−β1 ,
which provides the lower bound. By the union bound
1− FX1+X2(x) = P(X1 +X2 > x) ≤ P(X1 > x/2) + P(X2 > x/2)
≤ 2− FX1(x/2)− FX2(x/2)
≤ B2,1(x/2)1−β1 +B2,2(x/2)1−β2
≤ (B2,12β1−1 +B2,22β2−1)x1−β1
and we obtain the upper bound.
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5.2 The Effect of Portfolio Diversification and Similarity
For simplicity, throughout this section we assume that the limiting total asset holdings Xtot =
X1 + . . . + XM are Pareto distributed with density fXtot(x) = (β − 1)x−β1{x ≥ 1} for some
exponent β > 2. One can generalize the example also to more general distributions. Further,
we make the assumptions that ρ(u) = 1{u ≥ 1} and hm(χ) = 1−e−χm to simplify calculations,
but also for other sensible choices our observations below are applicable.
In a first setting we consider a system of institutions whose investment in each asset m ∈ [M ]
makes up a fraction λm ∈ R+ of their total asset holdings, where
∑
m∈[M ] λ
m = 1.
Example 5.4. For a system as described above the functions fm(χ) are given by
fm(χ) = λmE
[
X tot1
{
X tot
M∑
`=1
λ`
(
1− e−χ`
)
≥ C
}]
− χm, m ∈ [M ].
Let us write t =
∑
1≤`≤M λ
`(1 − e−χ`) for short. Now assume similar to Corollary 5.1 that
C = α(X tot)γ for some constants α, γ ∈ R+,0. Then
fm(χ) = λmE
[
X tot1
{
X tot ≥ (α/t) 11−γ
}]
− χm
= λm
∫ ∞
max{1,(α/t)1/(1−γ)}
(β − 1)x1−β dx− χm = λmβ − 1
β − 2 min
{
1, (tα−1)
β−2
1−γ
}
− χm.
Motivated by the symmetry of the functions, we consider fm(χ) along direction v ∈ RM+ , with
vm = (λm)−1. Then
fm(χv)
λm
=
β − 1
β − 2
(
α−1
M∑
`=1
λ`
(
1− e−χ/λ`
))β−21−γ
− χ
(λm)2
.
Let γc := 3 − β and αc :=
∑
m∈[M ](λ
m)2(β − 1)/(β − 2). We infer that if χ ∈ R+,0 is small
enough and γ > γc or γ = γc and α > αc, then
d
dχf
m(χv) < 0 for all m ∈ [M ]. That is, χ∗ = 0
and the auxiliary system is resilient by Corollary 3.6. On the other hand, if either γ < γc or
γ = γc and α < αc, then
d
dχf
m(χv) > 0 for all m ∈ [M ] and the system is non-resilient by
Theorem 3.7. Since γc does not depend on the choice of {λm}m∈[M ], it makes sense to consider
αc as a measure for stability of the system (the smaller αc, the more stable the system). Clearly,
αc becomes minimized for λ
m = M−1 for all m ∈ [M ] and hence a perfectly diversified system
requires least capital and can be seen as the most stable (see also discussion after Example 5.5).
Next, we consider a financial system that comprises of S ∈ N subsystems of equal size n/S. For
each subsystem s ∈ [S] there is a set of Ds = D ∈ N specialized assets that can only be invested
in by institutions from s. In addition to these S ·D specialized assets, there is a set of J ∈ N
joint assets that can be invested in by any institution. Thus, each institution can choose from
∆ := D + J different assets to invest in. We call ∆ the diversification of the system. Further,
let Σ := J/∆ be the (portfolio) similarity in the system. Then, as in Example 5.4, one possible
route to take is it determine the optimal investments for each institution (that is shifted towards
investing in the specialized assets to avoid overlap with other subsystems). Instead we assume
in the following example that each institution still perfectly diversifies its investment over the
∆ = D + J assets available to it.
Example 5.5. Consider a system as described above consisting of S subsystems and allowing
each institution to invest in D specialized assets and in J joint assets in equal shares. Then the
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Figure 5: Figure corresponding to the simulation study. (a) The effect of varying portfolio
diversification ∆ as Σ = 0.5 is fixed. (b) The effect of varying portfolio similarity as ∆ = 20
is fixed. In blue: the theoretical final default fraction. In orange: 10 exemplary simulations. In
green: the median over 103 simulations.
system is described by the following functions:
f j(χ) := S−1
S∑
s=1
E
[
X tot
D + J
1
{
X tot
D + J
(
J∑
k=1
(
1− e−χk
)
+
D∑
d=1
(
1− e−χs,d
))
≥ C
}]
− χj ,
fs,d(χ) := S−1E
 X tot
D + J
1
 X totD + J
 J∑
j=1
(
1− e−χj
)
+
D∑
e=1
(
1− e−χs,e)
 ≥ C

− χs,d,
where j ∈ [J ], s ∈ [S], d ∈ [D] and χ = (χ1, . . . , χJ , χ1,1, . . . , χS,D) ∈ RJ+SD+,0 with small misuse
of notation. Similar as in Example 5.4 we derive that
γc = 3− β and αc =
J + DS
(D + J)2
β − 1
β − 2 =
1 + (S − 1)Σ
∆S
β − 1
β − 2 .
From the formula it is obvious that αc decreases (i. e. capital required to ensure resilience) as ∆
increases or Σ decreases.
The examples show that diversification reduces the capital necessary to ensure resilience
whereas stronger similarity between the institutions’ portfolios increases it. The fact that di-
versification is favourable might seem at odds with other studies in the literature (see for example
[26, 5, 32]), which find that diversification can increase externalities and is less favourable from a
systemic risk perspective. In the second example this discrepancy is not surprising, as increased
diversity arises due to an increased number of assets. In the first example it is due the fact
that capital requirements ensure resilience and that amplification effects are small. The sales
pressure arising from the shock to some banks is then distributed among more assets, each of
them being less impacted. Spillover effects to other institutions are contained due to the nature
of the capital requirements based on Xtot.
Simulation Study Note that all previous conclusions build on the (asymptotic) theory de-
veloped in the previous sections. To verify and back up the result for finite systems, however,
we also give a simulation based verification for a series of moderate size (n = 104) systems. In
the setting of the last example our choices of the parameters are as follows. We set β = 3 and
S = 2 and D = J = 10. Then we obtain ∆ = 20, Σ = 0.5, γc = 0 and αc = 0.075. We assign
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to each institution the capital ci = αc. Further, we draw the total asset holdings x
tot
i for each
institution i ∈ [n] as random numbers according to the above described Pareto distribution.
Finally, we randomly choose a set of initially defaulted institutions of size 0.01n and equally
distribute it across the S subsystems.
To see the effect of diversification, we first fix Σ = 0.5 and let D = J vary from 1 to 20
(i.e. ∆ ∈ [40]). The results are plotted in Figure 5(a). Since we calibrated the capitals ci = αc
to the values ∆ = 20 and Σ = 0.5, the theoretical (asymptotic) final default fraction is 1 for
∆ ≤ 20 and 0 otherwise. This curve is shown in blue. In orange we illustrate 10 of the 103
simulations. One can see that in each simulation the final default fraction rapidly decreases at
a certain value for ∆ close to the theoretical value of 20. In green finally, we plot the median
over all 103 simulations which is very close to the theoretical curve despite the finite system
size and hence verifies that systems become more resilient as ∆ increases. Deviations from the
theoretical curve become smaller as n increases.
Furthermore, in the same setting we conducted simulations for systems of fixed diversifica-
tion ∆ = 20 and varying similarity Σ between 0 and 1 (J ∈ [0, 20] and D = 20−J). The results
are shown in Figure 5(b). Again, in blue we plot the theoretically predicted curve which is 0
for Σ < 0.5 and 1 otherwise. In orange 10 exemplary simulations are shown. For these, one can
see that either there exists an individual threshold for Σ close to 0.5 at which the final default
fraction rapidly increases or the final fraction stays constant at 1%. The median over the 103
simulations for each Σ can be seen in green and it verifies that the system becomes less resilient
as the similarity Σ increases. Again deviations from the theoretical curve are due to finite size
effects and become smaller as n increases.
6 Conclusions & Future Research Directions
In this paper we introduced and studied a model for fire sales. Our model describes the state of
a financial system by specifying for each participant the capital and the amount of m distinct
assets that she posseses. All this information is concisely represented by the emprical distribu-
tion function of the previously mentioned parameters. Then this system gets initially shocked
– the participants suffer losses – and as consequence assets gets sold, which causes the prices to
go down, and so an iterated process of selling and price decline starts rolling. Here we studied
the final state of the system, in particular the number of sold assets and the final default frac-
tion. Our main driving question was to understand which structural characteristics promote
or hinder the outbreak of fire sales, and thus our approach is fundamentally asymptotical in
nature: we ‘gathered’ all systems that are similar – in terms of the empirical distribution – and
studied, as the system size gets large, the effect of various statistical parameters of the (limiting)
distribution function. Our results provide in many settings a characterization of resilient and
non-resilient systems, and allow us to formulate explicit capital requirements as well as to study
the effect of portofolio correlations.
There is a whole bunch of questions that may be investigated within the framework developed
here.
• Finite Systems Our results are completely explicit in the stochastic model and thus, a
priori, apply to large systems only. Our simulation studies show that, however, they are
already good approximations for moderate-sized systems. A challenging direction for fu-
ture research is to quantify precisely the finite-size effect : how do our results qualitatively
carry over to systems of a given size n? How can we adapt the notions of (non-)resilience,
and what effect does it have, for example on the capital requirements that we develop?
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• Refined Models Our model describes the process of (distressed) selling of the assets.
However, there is no explicit modelling of other parties, like for example the buyers of
assets, or effects, like the buying of assets when the price drops. The effect of other parties
is captured here in an abstract way by the price impact function h. More refined models
representing the statistical properties of further market participants and actions would
constitute significant extensions of our model.
• Capital Allocation Strategies The results presented here allow us, among other
things, to formulate minimal capital requirements that make the system resilient to fire
sales. Thus, they constitute a building block of a more global capital allocation strategy
that should be capable of making complex systems with also other types of interactions
(like default/ liquidity contagion) resilient to initial stress. For example, our capital
requirements can be combined with classical value-at-risk requirements used in the Basel
III framework. Developing such global strategies and studying the interplay of various
interactions is a significant research topic.
• Portofolio Optimization Our results are not only applicable from the view of regula-
tors; they may also be utilized from market participants to optimize their portfolio with
respect to systemic risk considerations. Developing adequate strategies by taking into
consideration the effect of fire sales is a challenging open problem.
7 Generalised Statements and Proofs
7.1 Description and Analysis of the Fire Sales Process for a Discontinuous
Sale Function ρ
To focus on the underlying phenomena of fire sales rather than be restrained by technical details,
in the main part of this article we considered the special case of continuous sale functions ρ.
As already the simple example of sales at default ρ(u) = 1{u ≥ 1} shows, however, it is not
untypical for thresholds to exist at which institutions sell a positive fraction of their assets and
thus ρ to be discontinuous. By the explanation via thresholds, right-continuous sale functions
are more natural than sale functions with discontinuities from the right, and we thus assume ρ
to be right-continuous in the sequel and denote
◦
ρ(u) := lim→0+ ρ((1− )u) its left-continuous
modification. Replacing ρ by its right-continuous modification ρ(u) := lim→0+ ρ((1 + )u) in
the following, however, really makes our results applicable to any non-decreasing sale function
ρ. In addition to the results presented in the main body of the paper, the results presented here
quantify, besides the final number of sold shares, also the final number of defaulted banks.
7.1.1 The Deterministic Model
As for the continuous case in the main part of this article, we start by considering the auxiliary
process in the deterministic model. For a general non-decreasing sales function function ρ the
equation
E
[
Xnρ
(
Ln +Xn · h(χ)
Cn
)]
− χ = 0 (7.1)
(see (3.3)) has a smallest solution χn by the Knaster-Tarski theorem, and as in (3.4) it holds
n−1 limk→∞ σ(k) ≤ χn. For left-continuous ρ in fact we would derive equality but for right-
continuous ρ it is in general possible that n−1 limk→∞ σ(k) < χn. This is the case if limk→∞ σ(k)
sold shares would be enough to start a new round of fire sales but this quantity is actually never
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reached in finitely many rounds. Then the following holds and extends Proposition 3.1; the
proof is straight-forward by bounding ρ from below with its left-continuous modification
◦
ρ.
Proposition 7.1. Consider the auxiliary process with a right-continuous sales function ρ and
the corresponding left-continuous modification
◦
ρ. Let χn ∈ RM+,0 denote the smallest solution of
(7.1). Moreover, let χˆn ∈ RM+,0 be the smallest solution of
E
[
Xn
◦
ρ
(
Ln +Xn · h(χ)
Cn
)]
− χ = 0.
Then the number of sold shares divided by n at the end of the fire sales process satisfies
χˆn ≤ n−1 lim
k→∞
σ(k) ≤ χn. (7.2)
The equilibrium vector nχn (in the sense of (7.1)) is thus a conservative bound on the final
number of sold shares nχn = limk→∞ σ(k). However, as discussed above the convergence of the
fire sales process to a non-equilibrium heavily relies on the assumption of arbitrarily small sale
sizes towards the end of the process. For real systems this is obviously not realistic since the
least possible number of shares sold by an institution is lower bounded by 1. For all practical
purposes it will therefore hold that χn = χn and fire sales stop at an equilibrium state.
7.1.2 The Stochastic Model
We now consider a sequence of financial systems of increasing size n ∈ N as before satisfying
Assumption 2.1. As in Section 3.2 let fm, g : RM+,0 → R, m ∈ [M ] be given by
fm(χ) := E
[
Xmρ
(
L+X · h(χ)
C
)]
− χm, m ∈ [M ], g(χ) := P(L+X · h(χ) ≥ C).
Moreover, motivated by the lower bound in Proposition 7.1 define the lower semi-continuous
functions
◦
fm(χ) := E
[
Xm
◦
ρ
(
L+X · h(χ)
C
)]
− χm, m ∈ [M ], (7.3)
and let
◦
g(χ) := P(L+X · h(χ) > C).
In addition to the sets S and S0 from Section 3.2, now also define
◦
S :=
⋂
m∈[M ]
{
χ ∈ RM+,0 :
◦
fm(χ) ≥ 0
}
and denote by
◦
S0 the largest connected subset of
◦
S containing 0 (clearly
◦
fm(0) ≥ 0 for all
m ∈ [M ] and thus 0 ∈ S). Note that still S and S0 are closed sets as fm, m ∈ [M ], are upper
semi-continuous for the choice of right-continuous sale function ρ. Finally, as in Section 3.2 set
χ∗ ∈ RM+,0 with (χ∗)m := sup
χ∈S0
χm.
We can then state the following generalization of Lemma 3.3.
Lemma 7.2. There exists a smallest joint root χˆ of all functions
◦
fm(χ), m ∈ [M ], with χˆ ∈ S0.
Further, χ∗ as defined above is a joint root of the functions fm, m ∈ [M ], and χ∗ ∈ S0.
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In complete analogy to Theorem 3.4, but now without neccesitating Assumption 2.2, we can
describe the extent and impact of the auxiliary process together with bounds for the number of
defaulted institutions.
Theorem 7.3. Consider a (X, C)-system with initial shock L satisfying Assumption 2.1. As-
sume that ρ is right-continuous. Then for χmn , the number of finally sold shares of asset m ∈ [M ]
divided by n in the auxiliary process, and for the final default fraction n−1|Dn|,
χˆm + o(1) ≤ χmn ≤ (χ∗)m + o(1), ◦g(χˆ) + o(1) ≤ n−1|Dn| ≤ g(χ∗) + o(1).
In particular, for the final price impact hm(χn) on asset m ∈ [M ]
hm(χˆ) + o(1) ≤ hm(χn) ≤ hm(χ∗) + o(1).
In addition to instability of the joint root χˆ (as is explained in Subsection 3.2) another
explanation for χˆ 6= χ∗ could be that χˆ is a point of discontinuity for some fm but this again
is a rather pathological case. It then usually holds
◦
g(χˆ) = g(χ∗) and Theorem 7.3 determines
the limits of χn and n
−1|Dn| as n→∞.
7.1.3 (Non-)Resilience
In this section we study (non-)resilience properties of (X, C)-systems in the general setting; note
that these notions remains unaffected by our previous Assumption 2.2. The following statement
thus generalizes Theorem 3.5 and also includes a statement about the default fraction.
Theorem 7.4. Consider a (X, C)-system satisfying Assumption 1. Assume that ρ is right-
continuous. Then for each  > 0 there exists δ > 0 such that for all initial shocks L with
E[L/C] < δ, the number nχmn,L of finally sold shares of asset m ∈ [M ] and the final set of
defaulted institutions Dn,L in the shocked system satisfy
lim sup
n→∞
χmn,L ≤ (χ∗)m + , m ∈ [M ] and lim sup
n→∞
n−1|Dn,L| ≤ g(χ∗) + .
Using the notations of Section 7.1.2 also the wording of Corollary 3.6 remains completely
unchanged; that is, if χ∗ = 0, then the (X, C)-system satisfying Assumption 1 with right-
continuous ρ is resilient.
We now turn to the case χ∗ > 0. Theorem 3.7 remains unchanged in case ρ is strictly
increasing in a neighbourhood of 0. If ρ is not strictly increasing, we distinguish between
non-resilience and weak non-resilience.
Theorem 7.5. Consider a (X, C)-system satisfying Assumption 1. Assume that ρ is right-
continuous. Let  > 0. For every δ > 0 there exists a shock L with E[L/C] < δ and
lim inf
n→∞ χ
m
n,L > (χ
∗)m −  and lim inf
n→∞ n
−1|Dn,L| > ◦g(χ∗)− .
In particular from Theorem 7.5 we immediately get the following result.
Corollary 7.6 (Non-resilience Criterion). If χ∗ > 0, then the (X, C)-system is weakly non-
resilient under the auxiliary process.
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7.2 Proofs of Statements
7.2.1 Proofs for Section 3 (auxiliary process)
Proof. Proof of Lemma 7.2. Existence of χˆ follows from the Knaster-Tarski theorem. We now
construct a joint root
◦
S0 3 χ¯ ≤ χˆ such that we can conclude χˆ = χ¯ ∈
◦
S0. It holds
◦
fm(χˆ) = 0
for all m ∈ [M ] and thus (for any fixed m ∈ [M ]) ◦fm(χ) ≤ 0 for all χˆ ≥ χ ∈ RM+,0 such that
χm = χˆm by monotonicity of
◦
fm. Consider then the following sequence (χ(k))k∈N ⊂ RM+,0:
• χ(0) = 0 ∈
◦
S0
• χ(1) = (χ1(1), 0, . . . , 0), where 0 ≤ χ1(1) ≤ χˆ1 is the smallest possible value such that
◦
f1(χ(1)) = 0. It is possible to find such χ
1
(1) since
◦
f1(χ) + χ1 is monotonically increasing
in χ1,
◦
f1(0) ≥ 0 and ◦f1(χˆ1, 0, . . . , 0) ≤ 0. By monotonicity of ◦fm with respect to χ1 for all
m ∈ [M ]\{1}, it then holds ◦fm(χ(1)) ≥
◦
fm(0) ≥ 0 for all 1 6= m ∈ [M ] and in particular
χ(1) ∈
◦
S0.
• χ(2) = χ(1) + (0, χ2(2), 0, . . . , 0), where 0 ≤ χ2(2) ≤ χˆ2 is the smallest value such that
◦
f2(χ(2)) = 0. Again it is possible to find such χ
2
(2) since
◦
f2(χ) + χ2 is monotonically
increasing in χ2,
◦
f2(χ(1)) ≥ 0 and
◦
f2(χ(1) + (0, χˆ
2, 0, . . . , 0)) ≤ 0. By monotonicity of ◦fm
with respect to χ2 for all m ∈ [M ]\{2}, it then holds ◦fm(χ(2)) ≥
◦
fm(χ(1)) ≥ 0 for all
2 6= m ∈ [M ] and in particular χ(2) ∈
◦
S0.
• χ(i), i ∈ {3, . . . ,M}, are found analogously, changing only the corresponding coordinate.
• χ(M+1) = χ(M) + (χ1(M+1) − χ1(M), 0, . . . , 0), where χ1(M) ≤ χ1(M+1) ≤ χˆ1 is the smallest
value such that
◦
f1(χ(M+1)) = 0, which is again possible by monotonicity of
◦
f1(χ) + χ1,
◦
f1(χ(M)) ≥ 0 and
◦
f1(χ(M)+(χˆ
1−χ1(M), 0, . . . , 0)) ≤ 0. Further, it still holds χ(M+1) ∈
◦
S0.
• Continue for χi, i ≥M + 2.
The sequence (χ(k))k∈N constructed this way has the following properties: it is non-decreasing
in each coordinate and bounded inside [0, χˆ]. Hence by monotone convergence, each coordinate
of χ(k) converges and so χ¯ = limk→∞χ(k) exists. Since the convergence is from below,
◦
fm(χ¯) = E
[
Xm
◦
ρ
(
L+X · h(limk→∞χ(k))
C
)]
− lim
k→∞
χm(k)
= lim
k→∞
E
[
Xm
◦
ρ
(
L+X · h(χ(k))
C
)]
− χm(k) = lim
k→∞
◦
fm(χ(k)) ≥ 0
and thus χ¯ ∈ ◦S0. Now suppose there is m ∈ [M ] such that
◦
fm(χ¯) > 0. By lower semi-
continuity of
◦
fm then also
◦
fm(χ(k)) >  for some  > 0 and k large enough. This, however, is
a contradiction to the construction of the sequence (χ(k))k∈N since
◦
fm(χ(k)) = 0 in every M -th
step. Hence
◦
fm(χ¯) = 0 for all m ∈ [M ] and χ¯ is a joint root of all functions ◦fm, m ∈ [M ].
Now turn to the proof that χ∗ ∈ S0. We first consider the case that ρ is continuous. We
approximate χ∗ ∈ S0 by the sequence (χˆ())>0 of smallest fixpoints for the functions fm(χ)+.
This allows us to apply the Knaster-Tarski Theorem and the monotonicity properties of fm + 
27
as above. Simple topological arguments will then allow us to conclude that χ∗ ∈ S0. Let for
 > 0
S() :=
⋂
m∈[M ]
{
χ ∈ RM+,0 : fm(χ) ≥ −
}
and denote by S0() the connected component of 0 in S(). By the same procedure as for χˆ
above, we now derive that there exists a smallest (componentwise) point χˆ() ∈ S0() such that
fm(χˆ()) = − for all m ∈ [M ]. Clearly, χˆ() is non-decreasing (componentwise) in  and hence
χ˜ := lim→0+ χˆ() exists (we will show that χ˜ = χ∗ in fact).
Now by monotonicity of S0(), we derive that χˆ(δ) ∈ S0(δ) ⊆ S0() for all δ ≤ . Since
S0() is a closed set, it must thus hold that also χ˜ = limδ→0+ χˆ(δ) ∈ S0() for all  > 0 and
in particular, χ˜ ∈ ⋂>0 S0(). Further, we derive that ⋂>0 S0() ⊆ ⋂>0 S() ⊆ S. Moreover,⋂
>0 S0() is the intersection of a chain of connected, compact sets in the Hausdorff space RM
and it is hence a connected, compact set itself. Since it further contains 0, we can then conclude
that
⋂
>0 S0() ⊆ S0 and thus χ˜ ∈ S0.
Consider now an arbitrary χ ∈ S0. We want to show that χ ≤ χ˜ componentwise and thus
χ˜ = χ∗. It suffices to show that S0 ⊂ [0, χˆ()] for all . Then χ ≤ χˆ() and χ ≤ lim→0+ χˆ() =
χ˜. Hence assume that S0 6⊂ [0, χˆ()]. By connectedness of S0 we find χ¯ ∈ S0 with χ¯m ≤ χˆm()
for all m ∈ [M ] and equality for at least one coordinate (otherwise S0 ∩ ∂[0, χˆ()] = ∅ and
S0 =
(
S0 ∩
(
RM+,0\[0, χˆ()]
)) ∪ (S0 ∩ [0, χˆ())) is the union of two open non-empty sets and
hence not connected). W. l. o. g. let this coordinate be χ¯1. By monotonicity of f1 with respect
to χm for every 1 6= m ∈ [M ], we thus derive that f1(χ¯) ≤ f1(χˆ()) = − < 0 which is a
contradiction to χ¯ ∈ S0.
Now consider the general case that ρ is right-continuous and let (ρr(u))r∈N a sequence of
continuous sale functions approximating ρ from above. Denoting by Sr the analogue of S for
the sale function ρr, we derive that S =
⋂
r∈N S
r since clearly Sr ⊇ S for all r ∈ N and further
by dominated convergence for every χ ∈ ⋂r∈N Sr,
χm ≤ E
[
Xmρr
(
L+X · h(χ)
C
)]
→ E
[
Xmρ
(
L+X · h(χ)
C
)]
, as r →∞,
so that
⋂
r∈N S
r ⊆ S. If we further let Sr0 denote the largest connected subset of Sr containing
0, then Sr0 is compact and connected for every r ∈ N and hence so is
⋂
r∈N S
r
0 . Since further
0 ∈ ⋂r∈N Sr0 , we derive that ⋂r∈N Sr0 = S0. Let now χ∗r denote the analogue of χ∗ for the sale
function ρr. Then limr→∞χ∗r ∈ SR0 for all R ∈ N and hence limr→∞χ∗r ∈
⋂
R∈N S
R
0 = S0. Now
suppose there existed a vector χ ∈ S0 and m ∈ [M ] such that χm > limr→∞(χ∗r)m. Then also
for R large enough, χm > (χ∗R)
m and hence χ 6∈ SR0 . This, however, contradicts the assumption
that χ ∈ S0 =
⋂
R∈N S
R
0 . Hence there exists no such χ ∈ S0 and χ∗ = limr→∞χ∗r ∈ S0.
Finally, we show that χ∗ is a joint root of fm, m ∈ [M ]: Since χ∗ ∈ S0, it holds that
fm(χ∗) ≥ 0 for all m ∈ [M ]. Assume now that fm(χ∗) > 0 for some m ∈ [M ]. We can then
gradually increase the m-coordinate of χ∗ (until fm(χ∗) = 0). By monotonicity of fk(χ) with
respect to χm for every m 6= k ∈ [M ], however, we can be sure that we do not leave the set S0
by this procedure which is a contradiction to the definition of χ∗. Hence χ∗ is a joint root of
fm, m ∈ [M ].
Remark 7.7. In the proof of Lemma 3.3, for the case that ρ is continuous, we constructed
χ∗ as the limit of a sequence (χˆ())>0 such that fm(χˆ()) = − for all m ∈ [M ]. For non-
continuous ρ by the Knaster-Tarski theorem we still know that there exists a smallest vector
χˆ() such that fm(χˆ()) = −, but the construction of χˆ() as for χˆ in the proof of Lemma
3.3 fails and we can hence not be sure a priori that χˆ() ∈ S0(). Hence let further χ˜() be
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defined as the smallest vector in S0() such that f
m(χ˜()) = −. This vector exists again by the
Knaster-Tarski theorem noting that analogue to Lemma 3.3 S0() contains its componentwise
supremum χ∗(). Then by the same means as above, we derive that χ∗ = lim→0 χ˜().
The rest of the section is devoted to the proof of Theorem 7.3 (and Theorem 3.4). There
we are considering a sequence of financial systems. The following technical lemma about the
convergence of the smallest joint roots will be quite handy.
Lemma 7.8. Let a sequence (for r ∈ N) of financial systems be described by functions ◦fmr , m ∈
[M ], with smallest joint root χˆr. If lim infr→∞
◦
fmr (χ) ≥
◦
fm(χ) pointwise for every m ∈ [M ],
then lim infr→∞ χˆr ≥ χˆ, where χˆ denotes the smallest joint root of the functions
◦
fm, m ∈ [M ].
Proof. Proof. The main difficulty in showing the clraim is that lim infr→∞
◦
fmr (χ) ≥
◦
fm(χ) only
pointwise but not uniformly in χ. A further difficulty is the multidimensionality. The main
idea is to construct a path in analogy to the construction in Lemma 7.2 that leads to a point
χ˜() smaller but close to χˆ. On this path the functions
◦
fmr , m ∈ [M ] are all positive for r large.
It can then be compared componentwise with a path leading to χˆr.
For this consider the construction of χˆ in Lemma 7.2 and change it in such a way that
in each step k = LM + m (where L ∈ N0 and m ∈ [M ]) a point χ(k)() is chosen such that
◦
fm(χ(k)()) ≤  for some fixed  > 0 (choose χm(k)() ≥ χm(k−1)() as the smallest possible value
such that this inequality holds; it will then either be
◦
fm(χ(k)()) =  or χ(k)() = χ(k−1)()).
Note that
◦
fm(χ(k)()) <  can only happen if
◦
fm(0) <  in which case there exists k0 ∈ N∞ such
that χm(k) = 0 and
◦
fm(χ(k)) <  for all k ≤ k0 but
◦
fm(χ(k)) ≥  and χm(k) > 0 for k > k0. Then
(χ(k)())k∈N is a non-decreasing (componentwise) sequence bounded by χˆ and hence χ˜() =
limk→∞χ(k)() exists. Further, it holds that
◦
fm(χ˜()) ≤ lim infk→∞
◦
fm(χ(k)()) ≤ . Finally,
χ˜() is non-increasing componentwise in  and bounded inside [0, χˆ] and thus χ˜ = lim→0+ χ˜()
exists. Moreover,
◦
fm(χ˜) ≤ lim inf→0+
◦
fm(χ˜()) ≤ lim inf→0+  = 0 and hence in particular
χ˜ = χˆ.
Fix now δ > 0 and choose  > 0 small enough such that χ˜m() > χˆm(1 − δ)1/2 for all
m ∈ [M ]. Further, choose K = K() ∈ N large enough such that χm(K)() > χ˜m()(1− δ)1/2 for
all m ∈ [M ]. In particular, χm(K)() > χˆm(1 − δ). Now note that χˆr can be constructed by a
sequence (χ(k,r))k∈N analogue to χˆ in the proof of Lemma 3.3 as well. We can then in each step
k ∈ N cap the element of the constructing sequence χ(k,r) at χ(k)(), which clearly does not
increase the limit of the sequence. We want to make sure that in fact the cap is used in every step
k ≤ K if we only choose r large enough. Then we can conclude that χˆr ≥ χ(K)() ≥ χˆ(1− δ)
and hence letting δ → 0, lim infr→∞ χˆr ≥ χˆ.
We now show that the cap is applied in every step k ≤ K for r large enough by an induction
argument. For k = 0, clearly χ(k,r) = χ(k)() = 0 and the cap is applied. Now lets assume it
holds for k ≤ k0 < K. If χ(k0+1)() = χ(k0)(), then of course the cap is also applied in step k0+1
as the sequence χ(k,r) is increasing. Otherwise, note that by definition of χ(k0+1)(), it holds◦
fm(χ) ≥  for all χ ∈ RM+,0 such that χm ∈ [χm(k0)(), χm(k0+1)()] and χ` = χ`(k0)() = χ`(k0+1)()
for all ` ∈ [M ]\{m}. Now choose a discretization {χj}0≤j≤J of [χm(k0)(), χm(k0+1)()] for J < ∞
such that χ0 = χ
m
(k0)
(), χJ = χ
m
(k0+1)
() and χj−1 < χj < χj−1 + /3 for all j ∈ [J ]. We now
use the assumption that lim infr→∞
◦
fmr (χj) ≥
◦
fm(χj) for every 0 ≤ j ≤ J , where χmj = χj
and χ`j = χ
`
(k0)
() for ` ∈ [M ]\{m}. Then for r large enough, ◦fmr (χj) ≥
◦
fm(χj) − /3 ≥ 2/3.
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Finally, for any linear interpolation χ = αχj−1 + (1− α)χj between χj−1 and χj (α ∈ [0, 1]),
◦
fmr (χ) ≥
◦
fmr (χj−1) + χ
m
j−1 − χmj ≥ 2/3− /3 = /3.
Hence the cap is applied in step k0 + 1. As there are only finitely many steps k ≤ K, this
finishes the proof.
Proof. Proof of Theorem 7.3. We start by proving the lower bound. Recall from Proposition 7.1
that χn ≥ χˆn. Using weak convergence of the random vector (Xn, Cn, Ln) and approximating
◦
ρ from below by a sequence of continuous sale functions (ρr)r∈N, we derive for U ∈ R+ that
pointwise
lim inf
n→∞ E
[
Xmn
◦
ρ
(
Ln +Xn · h(χ))
Cn
)]
≥ lim
n→∞E
[
(Xmn ∧ U) ρr
(
Ln +Xn · h(χ))
Cn
)]
= E
[
(Xm ∧ U) ρr
(
L+X · h(χ))
C
)]
.
Hence as U →∞ and r →∞ by monotone convergence,
lim inf
n→∞ E
[
Xmn
◦
ρ
(
Ln +Xn · h(χ)
Cn
)]
− χm ≥ ◦fm(χ)) (7.4)
and we can use Lemma 7.8 to derive that lim infn→∞χn ≥ lim infn→∞ χˆn ≥ χˆ.
We now want to show the lower bound on the final default fraction. Fix some δ > 0 and
choose n large enough such that χn ≥ χˆn ≥ (1− δ)χˆ componentwise. Then
n−1|Dn| = P (Ln +Xn · h(χn) ≥ Cn) ≥ P (Ln +Xn · h((1− δ)χˆ) > Cn) .
However, using weak convergence of (Xn, Cn, Ln) and approximating the indicator function
1{y > 1} from below by continuous functions (φt)t∈N, we derive that
lim inf
n→∞ n
−1|Dn| ≥ lim
n→∞E
[
φt
(
Ln +Xn · h((1− δ)χˆ)
Cn
)]
= E
[
φt
(
L+X · h((1− δ)χˆ)
C
)]
and as t→∞,
lim inf
n→∞ n
−1|Dn| ≥ P (L+X · h((1− δ)χˆ) > C) = ◦g((1− δ)χˆ).
This quantity now tends to
◦
g(χˆ) as δ → 0 by lower semi-continuity of ◦g.
Now we approach the second part of the theorem. Recall from Proposition 7.1 that χn ≤ χn.
By the construction of χ∗ in the proof of Lemma 3.3, we have a non-increasing (in ) sequence
(χˆ())>0 such that lim→0+ χˆ() = χ∗. (See Remark 7.7 for non-continuous ρ.) In particular,
χ∗ ≤ χˆ() for every  > 0 and fm(χˆ()) = −. Using weak convergence of (Xn, Cn, Ln) we
derive for U ∈ R+ and (ρs)s∈N an approximation of ρ from above by continuous sale functions
that
lim sup
n→∞
E
[
Xmn ρ
(
Ln +Xn · h(χˆ())
Cn
)]
= E[Xm]− lim inf
n→∞ E
[
Xmn
(
1− ρ
(
Ln +Xn · h(χˆ())
Cn
))]
≤ E[Xm]− lim inf
n→∞ E
[
(Xmn ∧ U)
(
1− ρs
(
Ln +Xn · h(χˆ())
Cn
))]
= E[Xm]− E
[
(Xm ∧ U)
(
1− ρs
(
L+X · h(χˆ())
C
))]
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and as U →∞, s→∞, by monotone convergence
lim sup
n→∞
E
[
Xmn ρ
(
Ln +Xn · h(χˆ())
Cn
)]
≤ fm(χˆ()) + χˆm() = χˆm()− .
Hence for n large enough it holds
E
[
Xmn ρ
(
Ln +Xn · h(χˆ())
Cn
)]
− χˆm() ≤ −/2 < 0
for all m ∈ [M ]. In particular, we know that χn ≤ χˆ(). Letting  → 0, this shows that
lim supn→∞ χmn ≤ lim supn→∞ χmn ≤ (χ∗)m for all m ∈ [M ] and hence completes the proof of
the upper bound on finally sold assets.
For the upper bound on the final default fraction n−1|Dn| = P(Ln + Xn · h(χn) ≥ Cn),
approximate the indicator function 1{y ≥ 1} from above by continuous functions (ψt)t∈N and
use weak convergence of (Xn, Cn, Ln) to derive
lim sup
n→∞
n−1|Dn| ≤ lim
n→∞E
[
ψt
(
Ln +Xn · h(χˆ())
Cn
)]
= E
[
ψt
(
L+X · h(χˆ())
C
)]
and as t → ∞, lim supn→∞ n−1|Dn| ≤ g(χˆ()). Letting  → 0, thus shows the second part of
the theorem by upper semi-continuity of g.
In the following two proofs we use the notations g, fm,
◦
g,
◦
fm, χˆ and χ∗ as introduced in
7.1.2 but for an unshocked (X, C)-system. If instead we index these quantities by ·L, we mean
the system shocked by L.
Proof. Proof of Theorem 3.5. By Remark 7.7, there exists a sequence of vectors χ˜(γ) ∈ RM+,0
such that fm(χ˜(γ)) = −γ for all m ∈ [M ] and arbitrary γ ∈ R+. Now for arbitrary α ∈ R+ it
holds that
fmL (χ) = E
[
Xmρ
(
L+X · h(χ)
C
)]
− χm
≤ E
[
Xm1
{
L
C
≥ α
}]
+ E
[
Xmρ
(
αC +X · h(χ)
C
)]
− χm.
Since E[L/C] < δ, by Markov’s inequality it holds that P(L/C ≥ α) ≤ δ/α and hence for δ > 0
small enough, we have E[Xm1{L/C ≥ α}] ≤ γ/3 (recall that E[Xm] < ∞). By dominated
convergence and right-continuity of ρ, it thus holds that fmL (χ) ≤ fm(χ)+2γ/3 for α > 0 small
enough such that
E
[
Xmρ
(
αC +X · h(χ)
C
)]
≤ E
[
Xmρ
(
X · h(χ)
C
)]
+ γ/3.
In particular, fmL (χ˜(γ)) ≤ −γ/3 < 0 and hence χ∗L < χ˜(γ) for δ small enough. By similar
means, we further derive that for δ small enough it holds gL(χ˜(γ)) ≤ g(χ˜(γ)) + /3. Together
with Theorem 3.4, we thus derive that
lim sup
n→∞
n−1|Dn,L| ≤ gL(χ∗L) + /3 ≤ gL(χ˜(γ)) + /3 ≤ g(χ˜(γ)) + 2/3.
Now since χ˜(γ) → χ∗ and by upper semi-continuity of g, we can choose γ > 0 small enough
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such that g(χ˜(γ)) ≤ g(χ∗) + /3 and conclude that lim supn→∞ n−1|Dn,L| ≤ g(χ∗) + .
For the bound on (χmn,L) choose γ and δ small enough such that (χ
∗
L)
m ≤ χ˜m(γ) + /3 ≤
(χ∗)m + 2/3 and conclude by Theorem 3.4 that
lim sup
n→∞
(χmn,L) ≤ (χ∗L)m + /3 ≤ (χ∗)m + .
Proof. Proof of Theorem 3.7. For some l ∈ [M ] it must hold that P(L,X l > 0) > 0 and thus
there exists δ > 0 and A ⊂ Ω such that L,X l ≥ δ on A. Then we can find A˜ ⊂ A and x0
large such that C ≤ x0 on A˜ and therefore L/C ≥ δ/x0 on A˜. Since ρ is assumed to be strictly
increasing we can conclude that ε := ρ(δ/x0) > 0. We obtain that
E
[
X lρ
(
L+X · h(0)
C
)]
≥ εδP(A˜) > 0
and thus
◦
f lL(0) > 0. Therefore 0 is not a joint root of the functions
◦
fmL (0),m ∈ [M ] and in
fact the auxilary process starts. Because of
◦
fmL (χ) ≥
◦
fm(χ) it follows that χˆL ≥ χ∗ and thus
Theorem 7.4 completes the proof.
Proof. Proof of Theorem 7.5. For a given δ > 0 we consider a shock which is such that P(L =
2C) = δ/3 and P(L = 0) = 1− δ/3. Such shock can be chosen to be independent of X. Then
clearly E[L/C] = (2/3)δ < δ. Moreover since ρ(1) = 1 it follows that
◦
fmL (0) = E[Xm](2/3)δ for
m ∈ [M ]. Since E[X l] > 0 for some l ∈ [M ], it follows that ◦f lL(0) > 0 for some l ∈ [M ]. Now
the same arguments as in the proof of Theorem 3.7 can be applied.
7.2.2 Proofs for Section 4 (Fire Sales Process)
Proof. Proof of Theorem 4.6 We start with the case 1−νq > 0. Using Theorem 4.2 it is enough
to show for some fixed ε ∈ (0, 1) that lim infn→∞ E[Xρε
(
Xh(an)
C
)
]/an > 1 for any sequence
(an)n≥1 with limn→∞ an = 0. Using Fatou’s lemma we get that
lim inf
n→∞ E
[
Xρε
(
Xh(an)
C
)
/an
]
≥ E
[
lim inf
n→∞ Xρε
(
Xh(an)
C
)
/an
]
= E
[
lim inf
n→∞ X
(
Xaνn
C
)q
/an
]
= E
[
lim inf
n→∞ a
νq−1
n X
(
X
C
)q]
= E
[∞ · 1{X(X/C)q 6=0}] =∞,
and thus the real system is non-resilient.
We next look at the case 1−νq = 0. Let E[X(X/C)q] < 1. We show resilience of the auxiliary
process from which resilience for the real process follows by Theorem 4.1. As before, let (an)n≥1
be a sequence with limn→∞ an = 0. We need to show that lim supn→∞ E[Xρ (Xh(an)/C)]/an <
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1. Define the event An := {(X/C)q ≤ 1/an}. First observe that since q = 1/ν
Xa−1n ρ
(
Xh(an)
C
)
= Xa−1n
(
Xh(an)
C
)q
1An +Xa
−1
n 1Acn
= X(X/C)q1An +Xa
−1
n 1Acn
≤ X(X/C)q1An +X(X/C)q1Acn = X(X/C)q.
It follows that
lim
n→∞E
[
Xa−1n ρ
(
Xh(an)
C
)]
≤ lim
n→∞E [X(X/C)
q] = E [X(X/C)q] < 1,
and thus the system is resilient. On the contrary if E[X(X/C)q] > 1, then for fixed ε > 0 define
An := {(X/C)q ≤ (1/an)ε} and observe that An ↗ Ω. It follows for ε > 0 small enough that
lim
n→∞E
[
(1− ε)Xa−1n ρε
(
Xh(an)
C
)]
≥ lim
n→∞E[(1− ε)X(X/C)
q1An ] > 1,
and thus the real system is non-resilient.
Now consider the remaining case 1 − νq < 0. First assume that α∗ > 1/ν, where we
claim resilience of the auxiliary process. Chose 1 < δ such that δ(1/ν) < min{α∗, q} and set
An := {(X/C)1/ν ≤ 1/an}. Then
E
[
Xa−1n ρ
(
Xh(an)
C
)]
= E
[
Xa−1n
(
Xh(an)
C
)q
1An
]
+ E
[
Xa−1n 1Acn
]
= aνq−1n E
[
X
(
X
C
)q
1An
]
+ E
[
Xa−1n 1Acn
]
. (7.5)
For the first term observe that
aνq−1n E
[
X
(
X
C
)q
1An
]
= aνq−1n E
[
X
(
X
C
)δ/ν (X
C
)q−δ/ν
1An
]
= aνq−1n E
[
X
(
X
C
)δ/ν (X
C
)q−δ/ν
1{(X/C)q−δ/ν≤(1/an)νq−δ}
]
≤ aνq−1n E
[
X
(
X
C
)δ/ν
a−νq+δn 1{(X/C)q−δ/ν≤a−νq+δn }
]
≤ aδ−1n E
[
X
(
X
C
)δ/ν]
,
and limn→∞ aδ−1n E
[
X(X/C)δ/ν
]
= 0 by the choice of δ and our assumption E
[
X(X/C)δ/ν
]
<
∞. For the second term in (7.5) we obtain by Markov’s inequality that
E
[
Xa−1n 1Acn
]
= a−1n E
[
X1{(X/C)δ/ν>(1/an)δ}
]
≤ (1/an)1−δE
[
X(X/C)δ/ν
]
and limn→∞(1/an)1−δE
[
X(X/C)δ/ν
]
= 0 by the choice of δ.
To show non-resilience for α∗ < 1/ν, note that we assumed that the right derivative of f(·)
in 0 exists (possibly with value ∞). It is thus sufficient to find some ε > 0 and a particular
sequence (an)n≥1 with limn→∞ an = 0 such that
lim
n→∞E
[
X(1− ε)a−1n ρε
(
Xh(an)
C
)]
> 1.
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Define the event An := {(X/C)1/νε−1/qν ≥ 1/an}. Since
E
[
X(1− ε)a−1n ρε
(
Xh(an)
C
)]
≥ E
[
X(1− ε)a−1n ρε
(
Xh(an)
C
)
1An
]
≥ a−1n E [X(1− ε)ε1An ] ,
it is sufficient to find (an)n≥1 such that E [X1An ]  an. For this, choose δ < 1 such that
δ/ν > α∗. Using Fubini we obtain that
E
[
X
(
X
C
)δ/ν]
= E
[
X
∫ (X/C)δ/ν
0
1dt
]
= E
[
X
∫ ∞
0
1{t≤(X/C)δ/ν}dt
]
= E
[
X
∫ ∞
0
1{t≤(X/C)δ/ν}dt
]
= E
[
X
∫ ∞
0
1{t1/δε−1/qν≤(X/C)1/νε−1/qν}dt
]
=
∫ ∞
0
E
[
X1{t1/δε−1/qν≤(X/C)1/νε−1/qν}
]
dt =
∫ ∞
0
E
[
X1{u≤(X/C)1/νε−1/qν}u
δ−1ε−1/qν
]
du.
Since E[X (X/C)δ/ν ] =∞ it follows that E
[
X1{u≤(X/C)1/νε−1/qν}u
δ−1ε−1/qν
]
can not be domi-
nated by the function Cu−α for any α > 1 and C > 0. Chose now α such that δ+α < 2, C = 1
and a sequence (un)n≥1 such that
E
[
X1{u≤(X/C)1/νε−1/qν}u
δ−1ε−1/qν
]
≥ u−αn .
Set now an = 1/un. It follows by the choice of α and assuming that (1− ε)ε ≥ 1/2
lim
n→∞ a
−1
n E [X(1− ε)ε1An ] ≥ limn→∞unE
[
X1{un≤(X/C)1/νε−1/qν}
]
/2 = lim
n→∞u
2−α−δ
n /2 =∞.
7.3 The Choice of the Sales Function
Some concrete examples for sales functions ρ are as follows:
• The perhaps simplest non-trivial example is ρ(u) = 1{u ≥ 1}. It describes complete
liquidation of the portfolio at default (if the institution is leveraged) resp. dissolution.
• A more involved example can be derived from a leverage constraint that prohibits an
institution from investing more money into risky assets than a certain multiple λmax ≥ 1
of its capital/equity. In the one-asset case this means that xp/c =: λ ≤ λmax, where x
denotes the number of shares held, p is the price per share and c denotes the institution’s
capital. Assume now that while the asset price p stays constant, the institution suffers an
exogenous shock ` and c is reduced to c˜ = c− `.
– If ` ≤ (1 − λ/λmax)c, then the leverage constraint xp/c˜ ≤ λmax is satisfied and no
reaction is required by the institution.
– However, if ` > (1 − λ/λmax)c, then the institution must get rid of some shares;
suppose that it sells δx of them, for some 0 < δ ≤ 1. In order for the leverage
constraint (1− δ)xp/c˜ ≤ λmax to hold, it is easy to verify that δ ≥ 1− (1− `c)λmaxλ .
The relative asset sales are hence given by ρ(`/c), where ρ(u) := (1 − (1 − u)λmax/λ)+
for u ∈ [0, 1]; this amounts to linear sales (with respect to the losses) once the threshold
1− λλ−1max is reached.
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• Taking an alternative route in the previous example, suppose that the loss of the institution
stems only from a price change p→ p˜ < p, which reduces the capital to c˜ = c−x(p− p˜). If
p˜ ≥ p(1− 1λ)/(1− 1λmax ), then no action is required to comply with the leverage constraint.
In the remaining cases the institution must sell a fraction of 1− λmax + λmax pp˜(1− 1λ) of
their assets, and we obtain ρ(u) = (1− λmax(1− u)/(λ− u))+ for u ∈ [0, 1].
• Finally, it can be shown that for price changes combined with exogenous losses the sale
function is bounded from above and below by the two previous cases. Leverage constraints
hence imply a sale function which is 0 below a certain threshold and then grows linearly.
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